

Multi-Agent Systems

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Typology of agent interaction



- Non-/Quasi-communicative interaction:
 - Shared environment (interaction via resource/capability sharing)
 - “Pheromone” communication (e.g., ant algorithms, remember slime mold)
- Knowledge-level Communication:
 - Information exchange: sharing knowledge, exchanging views and plans
 - Collaboration, distributed planning: optimising use of resources and distribution of tasks, coordinating execution
 - Negotiation: reaching agreement in the presence of conflict
 - Human-machine dialogue, reporting errors, etc.

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OOP vs. AOP



- Objects vs. Agents:
 - “Objects do it for free; agents do it for money.”(Jennings, Sycara, Wooldridge, 1998)
 - “Objects do it because they have to; agents because they want to.”(Joseph, Kawamura, 2001)
- Communication
 - OOP: Object o_2 can communicate with o_1 by invoking o_1 ’s method $m1$ (i.e., $o_1.m1(arg)$). In a way, object o_2 makes the decision to make o_1 to perform some action while o_1 has no control about it.
 - AOP: There is no such thing as method invocation. Agent i can try to act in a way to bring about that agent j intends what i intends, viz., by speech acts.

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Speech act theory



- Most multiagent approaches to communication based on [speech act theory](#) (started with Austin’s book, *How to Do Things with Words*, 1962)
- **Basic idea:** treat communication in a similar way as non-communicative action
- Austin (1962): Utterances are produced, and may have effects, like “physical” actions: utterances may change the state of the world:
 - *I hereby name this ship H.M.S titanic!*
 - *Bring me some beer!*
 - ⇒ Not true or false but appropriate or inappropriate
- In MAS speech act theory is used to specify how utterances are can be used to achieve intentions

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- A speech act can be conceptualised to consist of:
 - 1 **Locutionary act** (physical utterance)
 - 2 **Illocutionary act** (intended meaning)
 - 3 **Perlocution** (effect of the act)
- Two parts of a speech act:
 - 1 **Performative**: communicative verb used to distinguish between different “illocutionary forces”
Examples: promise, request, purport, insist, demand, etc.
 - 2 **Propositional content**: what the speech act is about
- Example:
 - Propositional content: “the window is open”
 - Performative: can be a request/inform/enquire

- Searle (1972) identified the following categories of **performatives**, each corresponding to a different type of speech acts:
 - **assertives/representatives** (informing, making a claim)
 - **directives** (requesting, commanding)
 - **commissives** (promising, refusing)
 - **declaratives** (effecting change to state of the world)
 - **expressives** (expressing mental states)
- Ambiguity problems: “The window is open.”
- Detection of performative for natural language understanding:
 - A: “Open the door!” (Directive: Request)
 - B: “Sure!” (Commissive: Promise)

⇒ Different types of speech acts require different conditions to hold to be meaningful.

Specification of speech acts in terms of the conditions under which they can be successfully completed.

Austin's **felicity conditions** for *declarations*:

- 1 **Conventionality of procedure**: There must be an accepted conventional procedure for the performative
- 2 **Complete execution**: The procedure must be executed correctly and completely
- 3 **Complete execution**: the speaker completes the speech act without errors or interruptions

Searle's **properties for success** of a *request*:

- 1 **I/O conditions**: ability to hear request
- 2 **Preparatory conditions**: requested action can be performed, speaker must believe this, hearer will not perform action anyway
- 3 **Sincerity conditions**: speaker wants action to be performed

- Communication as action: Preconditions and effects. Thus, we can ask for a plan of speech acts to achieve some goal.
- Cohen and Perrault (1979) proposed applying planning techniques to speech acts (STRIPS-style)
- Preconditions and effects describe **beliefs**, **abilities** and **wants** of participants
- Distinction between **can-do** and **want** preconditions
- Identified necessity of mediating acts, since speech acts say nothing about perlocutionary effect
- This has been the most influential approach to using communication in multiagent systems!

Specifications

- Request(s, h, α)
 - Cando.pr: $\text{Bel}_s \text{Can}_h \alpha \wedge \text{Bel}_s \text{Bel}_h \text{Can}_h \alpha$
 - Want.pr: $\text{Bel}_s \text{Want}_s \text{requestinstance}$
 - Effect: $\text{Bel}_h \text{Bel}_s \text{Want}_s \alpha$
- CauseToWant($a1, a2, \alpha$)
 - Cando.pr: $\text{Bel}_{a1} \text{Bel}_{a2} \text{Want}_{a2} \alpha$
 - Want.pr: –
 - Effect: $\text{Bel}_{a1} \text{Want}_{a1} \alpha$
- Guenther wants Jutta to get him some beer. He makes up the following plan:
 - 1 Request(guenther, jutta, getbeer)
 - 2 CauseToWant(jutta, guenther, getbeer)

Specifications

- Inform(s, h, φ)
 - Cando.pr: $\text{Bel}_s \varphi$
 - Want.pr: $\text{Bel}_s \text{Want}_s \text{informinstance}$
 - Effect: $\text{Bel}_h \text{Bel}_s \varphi$
- Convince($a1, a2, \alpha$)
 - Cando.pr: $\text{Bel}_{a1} \text{Bel}_{a2} \varphi$
 - Want.pr: –
 - Effect: $\text{Bel}_{a1} \varphi$
- Guenther wants Jutta to believe that the Britains have voted for Brexit. He makes up the following plan:
 - 1 Inform(guenther, jutta, brexitvoting)
 - 2 Convince(jutta, guenther, brexitvoting)

Agent communication languages

- Agent communication languages (ACLs) define standards for messages exchanged among agents
- Usually based on speech act theory, messages are specified by:
 - Sender/receiver(s) of the message
 - Performative to describe intended actions
 - Propositional content in some content language
- Most commonly used languages:
 - KQML/KIF
 - FIPA-ACL (today the de-facto standard)

FIPA: Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents
 KQML: Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language
 KIF: Knowledge Interchange Format

KQML/KIF

- KQML: Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language
- ... is an “outer” language, defines various performatives
- Example performatives:
 - ask-if (“is it true that ...”)
 - perform (“please do the following action ...”)
 - tell (“it is true that ...”)
 - reply (“the answer is ...”)
- Message format:


```
(performative
  :sender      <word>      :receiver  <word>
  :in-reply-to <word>      :reply-with <word>
  :language    <word>      :ontology   <word>
  :content     <expression>
)
```

Example: Advertise a capability

```
(advertise
  :sender      Agent1
  :receiver    Agent2
  :in-reply-to ID1
  :reply-with  ID2
  :language    KQML
  :ontology    kqml-ontology
  :content     (ask-if
                :sender  Agent1
                :receiver Agent3
                :language Prolog
                :ontology blocks-world
                :content  "on(X,Y)"
                )
)
```

KQML/KIF

- KQML is not suited as a general **content language**
- KIF (Knowledge Interchange Format): a logical language to describe knowledge
- ... essentially first-order logic with some extensions/restrictions
- Examples:
 - (forall (?x ?n) (=> (and (real-num ?x) (even-num ?n)) (> (expt ?x ?n) 0)))
 - (married guenther jutta)
 - (forall (?x) (=> (human ?x) (exists ?y (and (amountOfWater ?y) (essentialFor ?y ?x)))))
- KIF can also be used to describe the ontology referred to by interacting agents.

Example: Dialog

```
(evaluate
  :sender A      :receiver B
  :language KIF  :ontology motors
  :reply-with q1 :content (val (torque m1))
)
(reply
  :sender B      :receiver A
  :language KIF  :ontology motors
  :in-reply-to q1 :content (= (torque m1)
                             (scalar 12 kgf.m))
)
```

KQML/KIF

- KQML/KIF were very successful, but also some problems
- List of performatives (up to 41!) not fixed (interoperability problems)
- No formal semantics, only informal descriptions of meaning
- KQML completely lacks commissives, this is a massive restriction!
- Performative set of KQML rather ad hoc, not theoretically clear or very elegant

~ These lead to the development of FIPA ACL

Basic structure is quite similar to KQML:

- performatives: fixed set of 20 performatives in FIPA
- housekeeping: e.g., sender, receiver, message IDs
- content: the actual content of the message

Example:

```
(inform
  :sender agent1
  :receiver agent3
  :content (price goodABC 125)
  :language Prolog
  :ontology auction
)
```

performative	passing info	requesting info	negotiation	performing actions	error handling
accept-proposal			x		
agree				x	
cancel		x		x	
cfp			x		
confirm	x				
disconfirm	x				
failure					x
inform	x				
inform-if	x				
inform-ref	x				
not-understood					x
propose			x		
query-if		x			
query-ref		x			
refuse				x	
reject-proposal			x		
request				x	
request-when				x	
request-whenever				x	
subscribe		x			

Inform and Request

The meaning of inform and request is defined in two parts:

- **feasibility pre-condition**: what must be true in order for the speech act to succeed
- **rational effect**: what the sender of the message hopes to bring about

$\langle i, \text{inform}(j, \varphi) \rangle$

- feasibility precondition:
 $B_i \varphi \wedge \neg B_i (B_j \varphi \vee B_j \neg \varphi \vee U_j \varphi \vee U_j \neg \varphi)$
- rational effect: $B_j \varphi$

$\langle i, \text{request}(j, \alpha) \rangle$

- feasibility precondition: $B_i \text{Agent}(\alpha, j) \wedge \neg B_i I_j \text{Done}(\alpha)$
- rational effect: $\text{Done}(\alpha)$

Problems

- Impossible for the speaker to enforce those beliefs on the hearer! No way to verify mental state of agent on the grounds of its (communicative) behavior. This is a fundamental problem of all mentalistic approaches to communication semantics!
- Alternative approaches use the notion of **social commitments**
 - Idea: "A debtor s is indebted to a creditor h to perform action α or to believe proposition φ "
 - $[\text{inform}(s, h, \varphi)] O_{s,h} B_s \varphi$
 - $[\text{promise}(s, h, \alpha)] O_{s,h} I_s \alpha$
 - Often public commitment stores are used to track status of generated commitments
 - Benefit: at least (non)fulfilment of commitments can be verified

Moods of messages

- **Indicative: :**
 - "I have run out of milk."
 - **Example:** `send:(amountLeft(milk, 0))`
- **Declarative: !**
 - "I want the door to be closed!"
 - **Example:** `send!(status(door, closed))`
- **Interrogative: ?**
 - "What time is it?"
 - **Example:** `send?(timeNow(_))`
- No inbuilt check of precondition and rational effects.
- Agents may lie, and agents may ignore others' messages.

- Fridge runs out of milk and tells the grocery planner.
 - **if** `bel(amountLeft(milk, 0))` **then**
`(groceryplanner).send:(amountLeft(milk, 0))`
- Grocery planner receives the message and adopts buying milk as a new goal.
 - **if** `(fridge).sent:(amountLeft(milk, 0))` **then** `adopt(buy(milk))`.
- Special agent expressions:
 - **all:** all agents in the MAS
 - **allother:** all agents except the sending agent
 - **some:** select some agent randomly
 - **someother:** random selection among the other agents
 - **self:** the sender itself

- One aspect we have not discussed so far: how can agents ensure the **terminology** they use is commonly understood?
- A prerequisite for meaningful communication is to agree on a "formal, explicit specification of a shared conceptualization" ^{def} = **Ontology!**





Fig.: Source: [4]



- Axioms constrain the interpretations. Ideally, the possible interpretations match the intended interpretations.
- Example: $\forall x, y [E(x) \rightarrow \exists y [TQ(y) \wedge I(y, x)]]$ excludes interpretations in which something is an event but not located in time.

From a domain modeller's perspective, an ontology is a (terminological) knowledge base given by:

- a **vocabulary** used to describe some given domain
- a specification of the **intended meaning** of the vocabulary
- possibly, further constraints specifying additional domain knowledge

The aim is:

- to specify a common understanding of the domain
- to have a formal and machine-readable model of the domain
- Linking domain-level ontologies to upper ontologies can help to increase interoperability

An ontology should be:

- **meaningful**, e.g., all named classes can have instances
- **correct**, in the sense that domain experts can agree on the meaning of the vocabulary as specified in the ontology
- **rich**, in the sense that the specified meaning provides a reasonable approximation of the intended meaning of the vocabulary

Existing tools and reasoners (Protege, Fact++, Racer, etc.) can help to build such ontologies, but also to solve several reasoning tasks.

There exists a family of well-defined ontology languages (e.g., OWL-languages) with a solid logical basis (Description Logics).

- **Concept satisfiability**: Is there a model of the ontology such that the concept's interpretation is nonempty?
- **Concept subsumption**: Does concept *A* subsume concept *B*, i.e., must each (possible) instance of concept *B* be an instance of concept *A*?
- **Subsumption hierarchy**: Compute the subsumption relations between all pairs of named concepts mentioned in the ontology
- **Instance queries**: Given a knowledge base of the individuals of the domain, retrieve all instances that match a given query
- **Ontology mapping/alignment**: Given two ontologies of the same domain, map/align the concepts specified in both

- Speech act theory: Communicating as acting
- Formalizations of speech acts in terms of preconditions and effects on agents' mental states ...
- ... provide semantics for Agent Communication Languages
- Communication on the knowledge level requires agents to share an ontology

-  A subset of the slides is based on: Dr. Michael Rovatsos, The University of Edinburgh
<http://www.inf.ed.ac.uk/teaching/courses/abs/abs-timetable.html>
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