

- Sophisticated modes of social behavior require the ability to "put oneself in the position of someone else"
- Varieties of knowledge

Motivation: Theory of Mind

- Knowledge about others' knowledge:
  - First order:"John knows that the sun is shining"
  - Second order: "John knows that Mary knows that the sun is shining"
  - Third order:"John knows that Mary knows that Peter knows that the sun is shining"
  - ...
- Knowledge about one's own knowledge
  - Positive introspection: "I know that I know that the sun is shining"
  - Negative introspection: "I know that I don't know that the sun is shining"

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## Knowledge and Belief



- Belief is the attitute of assent towards the truth of particular propositions.
- Knowledge is true justified belief (Plato).
  - Justification: Evidence, or support, for your belief. I.e., if you just claim some truth without evidence, this does not count as knowledge.
- This definition is challenged by philosophical arguments (viz., by so-called Gettier cases).
- Standard epistemic logic is much more pragmatic, though:  $\approx$  knowledge is true belief.

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
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# Epistemic Alternatives

## Def. Epistemically Accessible, Epistemic Alternative

A particular world w' is epistemically accessible to an agent *i* in world *w* iff the set of all propositions *p* that agent *i* knows in *w* are compatible with all true propositions in w'. All such worlds w' are considered epistemic alternatives.

We also say that the epistemic alternatives are epistemically indistinguishable to the agent.



Agent *i* knows  $\varphi$  in world *w* iff.  $\varphi$  is true in all worlds *w'* epistemically accessible from *w* for *i*:

■  $M, w \models K_i \varphi$  iff. for all w' s.th.  $(w, w') \in R(K_i), M, w' \models \varphi$ 

Agent *i* believes  $\varphi$  in world *w* iff.  $\varphi$  is true in all worlds *w'* doxastically accessible from *w* for *i*:

■  $M, w \models B_i \varphi$  iff. for all w' s.th.  $(w, w') \in R(B_i), M, w' \models \varphi$ 

Additionally:

- $\blacksquare M, w \models \hat{K}_i \varphi \text{ iff. } M, w \models \neg K_i \neg \varphi.$
- $\blacksquare M, w \models \hat{B}_i \varphi \text{ iff. } M, w \models \neg B_i \neg \varphi.$

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
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
## Example: Coin Flipping





#### Quote [Hintikka & Halonen 98]

When you know that S, you can legitimately omit from consideration all possibilities under which it is not the case that S. In other words you can restrict your attention to the situations in which it is true that S.











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## Axiom B




From reflexivity (T) and Euclideanness (5) follows symmetry (B):  $\neg \phi \rightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$  (Proof:  $\neg \phi \Rightarrow_{\mathsf{T}} \neg K_i \phi \Rightarrow_{\mathsf{5}} K_i \neg K_i \phi \square$ )


- Objection: What is actually true must be known to be possibly true.
- Objection: A corollary of axiom B is ¬K<sub>i</sub>¬Kφ → φ, which is the same as KKφ → φ. In words: Only true things are considered possible to be known resp. believed.

As this seems too strong to most epistemologists, 5 (and thus B) is often rejected.  $\Rightarrow$  Alternative Axioms proposed: 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 However, in many computer science applications, B is considered appropriate: If the agent cannot find  $\varphi$  in its database, it can conclude that it knows that it does not know  $\varphi$ (closed-world assumption).

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## Mixing Knowledge and Belief



Building a logic with both Knowledge and Belief modalities interacting is non-trivial. Consider interaction axioms:

- **Entailment property:**  $K_i \phi \rightarrow B_i \phi$
- Positive certainty property:  $B_i \phi \rightarrow B_i K_i \phi$
- And let B be a **KD45** modality and K a **S5** modality. Then  $\neg B_i \varphi \rightarrow B_i \neg K_i \varphi$  holds (seems reasonable):
  - $\blacksquare \neg B_i \phi \Rightarrow_{\mathsf{Entailment}} \neg K_i \phi \Rightarrow_{\mathsf{5}} K_i \neg K_i \phi \Rightarrow_{\mathsf{Entailment}} B_i \neg K_i \phi \quad \Box$
- Objection
  - Let *p* be a proposition the agent believes, but in fact *p* is false:  $B_i p \land \neg p$
  - ⇒ Positive Certainty  $B_i K_i p$

$$\Rightarrow_{\mathsf{T}} \neg K_i p \Rightarrow_{\mathsf{5}} K_i \neg K_i p \Rightarrow_{\mathsf{Entailment}} B_i \neg K_i p \neq_{\mathsf{5}}$$

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# **Everyone Knows**



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
- $M, w \models E_G \varphi$  iff.  $M, w \models K_i \varphi$  for all  $i \in G$ .
- Write  $E_G^0 \varphi$  as an abbreviation of  $\varphi$ ,  $E_G^1 \varphi$  as an abbreviation for  $K_1 \varphi \wedge K_1 \varphi \wedge ...$ , and let  $E_G^{k+1} \varphi$  be an abbreviation for  $E_G E_G^k \varphi$ .


## Def. G-reachable in k steps

A world w' is *G*-reachable from world w in  $k \ge 1$  steps iff. there exists worlds  $u_0u_1 \dots u_k$  such that  $u_0 = w$  and  $u_k = w'$  and for all j with  $0 \le j \le k - 1$  there exists  $i \in G$  s.th.  $(u_j, u_{j+1}) \in R(K_i)$ .

## Lemma

 $M, w \models E_G^k \varphi$  iff.  $M, w' \models \varphi$  for all w' that are *G*-reachable from w in k steps.





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#### **Distributed Knowledge**

A group of agents G has distributed knowledge of  $\varphi$  iff the combined knowledge of the members of G implies  $\varphi$ . Idea: Eliminate all worlds that some agent in G considers impossible. Technically: Intersect the sets of worlds each agent in G considers possible. Hence:

■  $M, w \models D_G \varphi$  iff.  $M, w' \models \varphi$  for all w' s.th.  $(w, w') \in \bigcap_{i \in G} K_i$ 

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