

# Multi-Agent Systems

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## Overview



- Recap
  - Situations from various domains (Programs, Knowledge, Belief, Desire, Obligation) can nicely be modeled using [graphical models](#).
  - [Kripke models](#) formalize graphical models.
  - By constraining the [accessibility relations](#) of Kripke frames we obtain [classes](#) that correspond to above concepts (Knowledge, Belief etc.)
- Today
  - Introducing formal languages to talk about Kripke models and thus generally about Knowledge, Belief, Desire, Obligation ...

[Modal Logics](#)

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## Kripke Models



### Kripke Frame

Given a countable set of edge labels  $\mathcal{I}$ , a [Kripke Frame](#) is a tuple  $(W, R)$  such that:

- $W$  is a non-empty set of possible worlds, and
- $R : \mathcal{I} \rightarrow 2^{W \times W}$  maps each  $I \in \mathcal{I}$  to a binary relation  $R(I)$  on  $W$  (called the [accessibility relation](#) of  $I$ ).

### Kripke Model

$M = (W, R, V)$  is a [Kripke Model](#) where:

- $(W, R)$  is a Kripke frame, and
- $V : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow 2^W$  is called the [valuation](#) of a set of node labels  $\mathcal{P}$ .

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## Formulas of Modal Logic



The language  $\mathcal{F}$  of modal logic is inductively defined as follows:

- $\mathcal{P} \subseteq \mathcal{F}$ .
- $\{\top, \perp\} \subseteq \mathcal{F}$ .
- If  $\varphi \in \mathcal{F}$ , then  $\neg\varphi \in \mathcal{F}$ .
- If  $\varphi, \psi \in \mathcal{F}$  then  $(\varphi \wedge \psi), (\varphi \vee \psi), (\varphi \rightarrow \psi), (\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi) \in \mathcal{F}$
- If  $\varphi \in \mathcal{F}$  and  $I \in \mathcal{I}$ , then  $[I]\varphi, \langle I \rangle \varphi \in \mathcal{F}$ .

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
- Alethic logic (Necessity):  $\Box, \Diamond$
- Epistemic logic (Knowledge):  $\mathbf{K}, \hat{\mathbf{K}}$
- Doxastic logic (Belief):  $\mathbf{B}, \hat{\mathbf{B}}$
- Deontic logic (Obligation):  $\mathbf{O}, \mathbf{P}$
- Multi-Agent Epistemic logic: Agent name as subscript, e.g.,  $\mathbf{K}_{\text{mary}} \hat{\mathbf{K}}_{\text{john}} \text{sun\_shining}$
- **Notation:** Sometimes, we will decide that  $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket$  shall be read in context of epistemic logic, sometimes we will decide to read it in context of deontic logic. We then may also sometimes write  $K_I$  (i.e., Agent I knows), and  $O_I$  (i.e., Agent I ought to) instead of  $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket$ .

Given a Kripke model  $M$ , a possible world  $w$  of  $M$ , and a formula  $\phi$ . We define when  $\phi$  is true at  $w$ , written  $M, w \models \phi$ :

- $M, w \models p$  iff.  $w \in V(p)$ , for atomic formulae  $p \in \mathcal{P}$ .
- $M, w \not\models \perp$ .
- $M, w \models \top$ .
- $M, w \models \neg \phi$  iff.  $M, w \not\models \phi$ .
- $M, w \models (\phi \wedge \psi)$  iff.  $M, w \models \phi$  and  $M, w \models \psi$ .
- $M, w \models (\phi \vee \psi)$  iff.  $M, w \models \phi$  or  $M, w \models \psi$ .
- $M, w \models (\phi \rightarrow \psi)$  iff.  $M, w \not\models \phi$  or  $M, w \models \psi$ .
- $M, w \models (\phi \leftrightarrow \psi)$  iff.  $M, w \models (\phi \rightarrow \psi)$  and  $M, w \models (\psi \rightarrow \phi)$ .
- $M, w \models \llbracket I \rrbracket \phi$  iff. for every  $u$ : if  $(w, u) \in R(I)$  then  $M, u \models \phi$ .
- $M, w \models \langle I \rangle \phi$  iff. for some  $u$ :  $(w, u) \in R(I)$  and  $M, u \models \phi$ .

- 1  $M, w \models \llbracket I \rrbracket \phi$  iff.  $M, w \models \neg \langle I \rangle \neg \phi$
  - 2  $M, w \models \langle I \rangle \phi$  iff.  $M, w \models \neg \llbracket I \rrbracket \neg \phi$
- To see that (1):
    - $M, w \models \llbracket I \rrbracket \phi$
    - iff. for every  $u$ : if  $(w, u) \in R(I)$  then  $M, u \models \phi$
    - iff. it is not the case that for some  $u$ :  $(w, u) \in R(I)$  and  $M, u \models \neg \phi$
    - iff. not  $M, w \models \langle I \rangle \neg \phi$
    - iff.  $M, w \models \neg \langle I \rangle \neg \phi$


- **Question:** Is a given formula  $\phi$  true in world  $w$  in model  $M$ ?
- **Input:** A Kripke model  $M$ , a world  $w$  in  $M$ , and a formula  $\phi$ .
- **Output:** "Yes" if  $M, w \models \phi$ , "No" else.



- $M, w_1 \models \langle toggle \rangle \top \wedge [toggle][toggle]light\_on$ 
  - 1  $M, w_1 \models \langle toggle \rangle \top$ 
    - 1.1 for some  $u$ :  $(w_1, u) \in R(toggle)$  and  $M, u \models \top$ .
      - 1.1.1 we find  $(w_1, w_2) \in R(toggle)$  and  $M, w_2 \models \top$ . ☺
  - 2  $M, w_1 \models [toggle][toggle]light\_on$ 
    - 2.1 for every  $u$ : if  $(w_1, u) \in R(toggle)$  then  $M, u \models [toggle]light\_on$ 
      - 2.1.1  $M, w_2 \models [toggle]light\_on$ .
        - 2.1.1.1 for every  $u$ : if  $(w_2, u) \in R(toggle)$  then  $M, u \models light\_on$ 
          - 2.1.1.1.1  $M, w_1 \models light\_on$ . ☺

- A formula  $\varphi$  is **satisfiable in a model**  $M = (W, R, V)$ , if there exists a world  $w \in W$  such that  $M, w \models \varphi$ .
- A formula  $\varphi$  is **satisfiable in a frame** if it is satisfiable in a model based on that frame.
- A formula  $\varphi$  is **satisfiable in a class of frames** if it is satisfiable in a model based on some frame from the class of frames.
- A formula  $\varphi$  is **true in a model**  $M$  ( $M \models \varphi$ ) if  $\varphi$  is true in all worlds of  $M$ .

- A formula is **valid in a frame** if  $\varphi$  is true in all models based on that frame.
- We say that a formula  $\varphi$  is **valid in a class of frames**  $\mathbf{C}$  ( $\mathbf{K}$ ,  $\mathbf{T}$ ,  $\mathbf{D}$ ,  $\mathbf{4}$ ,  $\mathbf{5}$ , and combinations thereof), written  $\models_{\mathbf{C}} \varphi$ , iff.  $(W, R, V), w \models \varphi$ 
  - for every frame  $(W, R)$ ,
  - every valuation  $V$  over  $(W, R)$ ,
  - every world  $w$  in  $W$ .





- Valid formulas give us an idea of how the classes differ, and thus what is and is not specific to the **general behavior** of our modalities (Knowledge, Belief, Obligation etc.).
- Correspondences between classes of frames and formulas
  - $\Box(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\Box\phi \rightarrow \Box\psi)$  (for every formulae  $\phi, \psi$ ) is **K**-valid (valid in the class of all frames)
  - $\Box\phi \rightarrow \phi$  (for every formulae  $\phi$ ) is **T**-valid (exactly valid in the class of reflexive frames)
  - $\Box\phi \rightarrow \Box\Box\phi$  (for every formulae  $\phi$ ) is **D**-valid (exactly valid in the class of serial frames)
  - $\Box\phi \rightarrow \Box\Box\Box\phi$  (for every formulae  $\phi$ ) is **4**-valid (exactly valid in the class of transitive frames)
  - $\Box\Box\phi \rightarrow \Box\Box\Box\phi$  (for every formulae  $\phi$ ) is **5**-valid (exactly valid in the class of Euclidean frames)

- $\Box(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\Box\phi \rightarrow \Box\psi)$  is **K**-valid:
  - 1 Let  $M$  be a arbitrarily chosen Kripke model and  $w$  be a arbitrary world in  $M$ .
    - 1.1 Assume  $M, w \models \Box(\phi \rightarrow \psi)$  (otherwise the formula is true anyway 😊). Thus, for every world  $u$ : if  $(w, u) \in R(I)$  then  $M, u \models \phi \rightarrow \psi$ .
      - 1.1.1 If  $\Box\phi$  is false in  $w$ , then  $(\Box\phi \rightarrow \Box\psi)$  is true in  $w$ , and the overall formula is true in  $w$ . 😊
      - 1.1.2 If  $\Box\phi$  is true in  $w$ , then both  $\Box\phi \rightarrow \psi$  and  $\Box\phi$  are true in  $w$ . Thus, in every world  $u$  accessible from  $w$ , also  $\psi$  is true, i.e.,  $\Box\psi$  is true in  $w$ . Therefore, the overall formula is true in  $w$ . 😊

- $\Box\phi \rightarrow \phi$  is not **K**-valid:
  - Consider Kripke model  $M = (W, R, V)$  from class **K**:
    - $W = \{w\}$
    - $R(I) = \{\}$
    - $V(p) = \{\}$
  - Check that  $M, w \models \Box p$  and  $M, w \not\models p$ . Thus,  $M, w \not\models \Box p \rightarrow p$ .

- A formula  $\phi$  **entails**  $\psi$  in the class **C** (written  $\phi \models_C \psi$ ) iff for every model  $M$  based on some frame in **C** and every possible world  $w$  of  $M$ :
  - if  $M, w \models_C \phi$  then  $M, w \models_C \psi$
- Entailment can be reduced to validity:
  - $\phi \models_C \psi$  iff.  $\models_C \phi \rightarrow \psi$
  - $\Theta \models_C \psi$  iff.  $\models_C \bigwedge \Theta \rightarrow \psi$

- The validity problem can be reduced to the satisfiability problem:
  - Instead of asking whether  $\varphi$  is true in all worlds in all Kripke models in a class, we can ask if  $\neg\varphi$  is true in some world in some Kripke model in the class.
- Problem formulation:
  - **Input:** A formula  $\varphi$ .
  - **Output:** “Yes” if there is a Kripke model  $M$  and a world  $w$  of  $M$  such that  $M, w \models \varphi$ , “No” otherwise.
- It turns out that we can systematically search for Kripke models that satisfy some formula. With this tool at hand, we can algorithmically decide validity.

-  M. Wooldridge, *An Introduction to MultiAgent Systems*, John Wiley & Sons, 2002.
-  O. Gasquet, A. Herzig, B. Said, F. Schwarzentruher, *Kripke's Worlds — An Introduction to Modal Logics via Tableaux*, Springer, ISBN 978-3-7643-8503-3, 2014.