

Game Theory

13. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information

Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg



**UNI
FREIBURG**

Bernhard Nebel and Robert Mattmüller

1 Motivation



**UNI
FREIBURG**

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Summary



- **So far:** All state information is completely known by all players
- **Often in practice:** Only partial knowledge (e.g. card games)
- Extensive games **with imperfect information** model such situations using **information sets**, which are sets of histories.
- **Idea:** Decision points are now information sets.
- **Strategies:** **Mixed** (over pure strategies) or **behavioral** (collections of independent mixed decisions for each information set)
- Different from **incomplete** information games, in which there is uncertainty about the utility functions of the other players.

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Summary

2 Definitions



Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Summary

Definition (Extensive game)

An **extensive game** is a tuple $\Gamma = \langle N, H, P, f_C, (\mathcal{I}_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N} \rangle$ that consists of:

- A finite non-empty set N of **players**.
- A set H of (finite or infinite) sequences, called **histories**, such that
 - it contains the empty sequence $\langle \rangle \in H$,
 - H is closed under prefixes: if $\langle a^1, \dots, a^k \rangle \in H$ for some $k \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{\infty\}$, and $l < k$, then also $\langle a^1, \dots, a^l \rangle \in H$, and
 - H is closed under limits: if for some infinite sequence $\langle a^i \rangle_{i=1}^\infty$, we have $\langle a^i \rangle_{i=1}^k \in H$ for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$, then $\langle a^i \rangle_{i=1}^\infty \in H$.

All infinite histories and all histories $\langle a^i \rangle_{i=1}^k \in H$, for which there is no a^{k+1} such that $\langle a^i \rangle_{i=1}^{k+1} \in H$ are called **terminal histories** Z . Components of a history are called **actions**.

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Summary

Definition (Extensive game, ctd.)

- A **player function** $P : H \setminus Z \rightarrow N \cup \{c\}$ that determines which player's turn it is to move after a given nonterminal history, c signifying a **chance move**.
- $f_c(\cdot|h)$ is a probability distribution over $A(h)$.
- \mathcal{I}_i is the **information partition** for player i of $\{h \in H | P(h) = i\}$ with the property that $A(h) = A(h')$ whenever h and h' are in the same member of the partition. Members of the partition $I_i \in \mathcal{I}_i$ are called **information sets**.
- For each player $i \in N$, a **utility function** (or **payoff function**) $u_i : Z \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ defined on the set of terminal histories.

Γ is **finite**, if H is finite; **finite horizon**, if histories are bounded.

Motivation

Definitions

Recall


Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Summary

Example

Example



After player 1 chooses L , player 2 makes a move (A or B)
player 1 cannot observe.

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Summary

- We have already chance moves, but could we extend the model with **simultaneous moves** as well?
- Actually, we can already **model** them somehow.
- In the example game after the history $\langle L \rangle$, we have essentially a simultaneous move of player 1 and 2:
 - When player 2 moves, he does not know what player 1 will do.
 - After player 2 has made his move, player 1 does not know whether A or B was chosen.
 - Only after both players have acted, they are presented with the outcome.

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Summary

3 Recall



Motivation

Definitions

Recall



Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Summary

Information sets can be arbitrary. However, often we want to assume that agents always remember what they have learned before and which actions they have performed: **Perfect recall**.

Example (Imperfect recall)



- Left: Player 1 forgets that he made a move!
- Right: Player 1 cannot remember what his last move was.

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Summary

Definition (Experience record)

Given a history h of an extensive game, the function $X_i(h)$ is the sequence consisting of information sets that player i encounters in h and the actions that player i takes at them. X_i is called the **experience record** of player i in h .

Example

In our example game, Player 1 encounters two information sets in the history $h = \langle L, A \rangle$, namely $\langle \rangle$ and $\{\langle L, A \rangle, \langle L, B \rangle\}$. In the first information set, he chooses L . So $X_1(h) = \langle \langle \rangle, L, \{\langle L, A \rangle, \langle L, B \rangle\} \rangle$.

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Summary

Definition (Perfect Recall)

An extensive game has **perfect recall** if for each player i , we have $X_i(h) = X_i(h')$ whenever the histories h and h' are in the same information set of player i .

Example

In our example game, the only non-singleton information set satisfies the condition, since for $h = \langle L, A \rangle$ and $h' = \langle L, B \rangle$ we have $X_1(h) = X_1(h') = \langle \langle \rangle, L, \{ \langle L, A \rangle, \langle L, B \rangle \} \rangle$. For the imperfect recall examples, the actions are different for the two histories ending up in the non-singleton information set.

In most cases, our games will have perfect recall.

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Summary

4 Strategies and outcomes



Motivation

Definitions

Recall

**Strategies
and
outcomes**

Solution
Concepts

Summary

Definition (Pure strategy in an extensive game)

A **pure strategy** of a player i in an extensive game $\Gamma = \langle N, H, P, f_c, (\mathcal{I}_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N} \rangle$ is a function s_i that assigns an action from $A(I_i)$ to each information set I_i .

Remark: Note that the outcome of a strategy profile s is now a probability distribution (because of the chance moves).

Remark: Because of the chance moves and because of the imperfect information, it probably makes more sense to consider randomized strategies.

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes


Solution
Concepts

Summary

Definition (Mixed and behavioral strategies)

A **mixed strategy** of a player i in an extensive game $\Gamma = \langle N, H, P, f_C, (\mathcal{I}_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N} \rangle$ is a probability distribution over the set of i 's pure strategies. A **behavioral strategy** of player i is a collection $(\beta_i(I_i))_{I_i \in \mathcal{I}_i}$ of independent probability distributions, where $\beta_i(I_i)$ is a probability distribution over $A(I_i)$. For any history $h \in I_i \in \mathcal{I}_i$ and action $a \in A(h)$, we denote by $\beta_i(h)(a)$ the probability $\beta_i(I_i)(a)$ assigned by $\beta_i(I_i)$ to action a .

Example



- Player 1 has four **pure strategies** (two information sets, two actions at each).
- A **mixed strategy** is a probability distribution over those.
- A **behavioral strategy** is a pair of probability distributions, one for $\{\langle \rangle\}$ and one for $\{\langle L, A \rangle, \langle L, B \rangle\}$.

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Summary

The outcome of a (mixed or behavioral) strategy profile σ is a probability distribution over histories $O(\sigma)$, resulting from following the individual strategies.

- For any history $h = \langle a^1, \dots, a^k \rangle$ define a **pure strategy s_i of i to be consistent with h** if for any subhistory $h' = \langle a^1, \dots, a^\ell \rangle$ with $P(h') = i$ we have $s_i(h') = a^{\ell+1}$.
- For any history, let $\pi_i(h)$ be the sum of probabilities of pure strategies s_i from σ_i consistent with h .
- Then for any mixed profile σ , the probability that $O(\sigma)$ assigns to a terminal history h is: $\prod_{i \in NU\{c\}} \pi_i(h)$.
- For any behavioral profile β , the probability that $O(\beta)$ assigns to $h = \langle a^1, \dots, a^k \rangle$ is:
 $\prod_{k=0}^{K-1} \beta_{P(\langle a^1, \dots, a^k \rangle)}(\langle a^1, \dots, a^k \rangle)(a^{k+1})$.

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Summary


Definition

Two (mixed or behavioral) strategies of a player i are called **outcome-equivalent** if for every partial profile of pure strategies of the other players, the two strategies induce the same outcome.

Question: Can we find outcome-equivalent mixed strategies for behavioral strategies and vice versa?

Partial answer: Sometimes.

Example (Behavioral strategy without a mixed strategy)



Motivation

Definitions

Recall


Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Summary

- A behavioral strategy assigning non-zero probability to a and b generates outcomes $\langle a, a \rangle$, $\langle a, b \rangle$, and $\langle b \rangle$ with non-zero probability
- Since there are only the pure strategies playing a or b , no mixed strategy can produce $\langle a, b \rangle$.

Example (Mixed strategy without a behavioral strategy)



- Mix the two pure strategies LL and RR equally, resulting in the distribution $(1/2, 0, 0, 1/2)$.
- No behavioral strategy can accomplish this.

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Summary

If we restrict ourselves to games with perfect recall, however, everything works.

Theorem (Equivalence of mixed and behavioral strategies (Kuhn))

In a game of perfect recall, any mixed strategy of a given agent can be replaced by an equivalent behavioral strategy, and any behavioral strategy can be replaced by an equivalent mixed strategy.

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Summary

5 Solution Concepts

- Assessments
- Sequential rationality
- Sequential equilibrium
- Examples

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

**Solution
Concepts**

Assessments

Sequential
rationality

Sequential
equilibrium


Examples

Summary

Similar to the case of mixed strategies for strategic games, we define the utility for mixed and behavioral strategies as expected utility, summing over all histories:

$$U_i(\sigma) = \sum_{h \in H} u_i(h) \cdot O(\sigma)(h)$$

Example



- Mixed strategy (mixing a and b) σ :
 $U_1(\sigma) = 0$.
- Behavioral strategy β with $p = 1/2$ for a : $U_1(\beta) = 1/4$.

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies and outcomes

Solution Concepts

Assessments

Sequential rationality

Sequential equilibrium

Examples

Summary

Definition (Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies)

A **Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies** is a profile σ^* of mixed strategies with the property that for every player i :

$$U_i(\sigma_{-i}^*, \sigma_i^*) \geq U_i(\sigma_{-i}^*, \sigma_i) \text{ for every mixed strategy } \sigma_i \text{ of } i.$$

Note: Support lemma applies here as well.

Definition (Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies)

A **Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies** is a profile β^* of mixed strategies with the property that for every player i :

$$U_i(\beta_{-i}^*, \beta_i^*) \geq U_i(\beta_{-i}^*, \beta_i) \text{ for every behavioral strategy } \beta_i \text{ of } i.$$

Remark: Equivalent, provided we have perfect recall.

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Assessments

Sequential
rationality

Sequential
equilibrium


Examples

Summary

Eliminating imperfect equilibria



Example



Nash equilibria: (M, L) and (L, R)

Unreasonable ones: (L, R) , because in the info set of player 2,
 L dominates R

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Assessments

Sequential
rationality


Sequential
equilibrium

Examples

Summary

How have we got here?

Example



Nash equilibria: (L,R)

What should player 2 do, when he ends up in his info set?

Depends on his belief: if probability that M has been played $\geq 1/2$, then R is optimal, otherwise L .

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies and outcomes

Solution Concepts

Assessments

Sequential rationality

Sequential equilibrium

Examples

Summary

Let us take the beliefs about what has been played into account when defining an equilibrium.

Definition (Assessment)

An **assessment** in an extensive game is a pair (β, μ) , where β is a profile of behavioral strategies and μ is a function that assigns to every information set a probability distribution on the set of histories in the information set.

$\mu(I)(h)$ is the probability that player $P(I)$ assigns to the history $h \in I$, given I is reached. We have to modify the **outcome** function. Let $h^* = \langle a^1, \dots, a^K \rangle$ be a terminal history. Then:

- $O(\beta, \mu | I)(h^*) = 0$, if there is no subhistory of h^* in I ,
- $O(\beta, \mu | I)(h^*) = \mu(I)(h) \cdot \prod_{k=L}^{K-1} \beta_{P(\langle a^1, \dots, a^k \rangle)}(\langle a^1, \dots, a^k \rangle)(a^{k+1})$, if the subhistory $\langle a^1, \dots, a^L \rangle$ of h^* is in I with $L < K$.

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies and outcomes

Solution Concepts

Assessments

Sequential rationality

Sequential equilibrium

Examples

Summary

Similar to O , we extend U_i : $U_i(\beta, \mu | I_i) = O(\beta, \mu | I)(h^*) \cdot u_i(h^*)$.

Definition (Sequential rationality)

Let Γ be an extensive game with perfect recall. The assessment (β, μ) is **sequentially rational** if for every player i and every information $I_i \in \mathcal{I}_i$ we have

$$U_i(\beta, \mu | I_i) \geq U_i((\beta_{-i}, \beta'_i), \mu | I_i) \text{ for every } \beta'_i \text{ of } i.$$

Note: μ could be arbitrary!

- Motivation
- Definitions
- Recall
- Strategies and outcomes
- Solution Concepts
 - Assessments
 - Sequential rationality**
 - Sequential equilibrium
 - Examples
- Summary

We would at least require that the beliefs are consistent with the strategies, meaning they should be derived by the strategies.

In our earlier example, player 2's belief should be derived from the behavioral strategy of player 1. E.g., the probability that M has been played should be:

$$\mu(\{\langle M \rangle, \langle R \rangle\})(M) = \beta_1(\langle \rangle)(M) / \left(\beta_1(\langle \rangle)(M) + \beta_1(\langle \rangle)(R) \right).$$

In other words, we use Bayes' rule to determine μ . However, what to do when the denominator is 0?

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Assessments

Sequential
rationality

Sequential
equilibrium

Examples

Summary



By viewing an assessment as a limit of a sequence of **completely mixed** strategy profiles (all strategies are in the support), one can enforce the Bayes' condition also on information set that are not reached by an equilibrium profile.

Definition (Structural consistency)

Let Γ be a finite extensive game with perfect recall. An assessment (β, μ) is **structural consistent** if there is a sequence $((\beta^n, \mu^n))_{n=1}^{\infty}$ of assessments that converges to (β, μ) in Euclidian space and has the properties that each strategy profile β^n is completely mixed and that each belief system μ^n is derived from β^n using Bayes' rule.

Note: Kreps (1990) wrote: “a lot of bodies are buried in this definition.”

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Assessments

Sequential
rationality

Sequential
equilibrium

Examples

Summary



Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Assessments

Sequential
rationality

Sequential
equilibrium

Examples

Summary


Definition (Sequential equilibrium)

An assessment is a **sequential equilibrium** of a finite extensive game with perfect recall if it is sequentially rational and structurally consistent.

Note: There is always at least one such equilibrium.

Note: In an extensive game with **perfect** information, (β, μ) is a sequential equilibrium iff β is a **subgame-perfect equilibrium**.

Example



Let (β, μ) be as follows: $\beta_1(L) = 1$, $\beta_2(R) = 1$,
 $\mu(\{\langle M \rangle, \langle R \rangle\})(M) = \alpha$ for $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$. (β, μ) is consistent since
 $\beta_1^\varepsilon = (1 - \varepsilon, \alpha\varepsilon, (1 - \alpha)\varepsilon)$, $\beta_2^\varepsilon = (\varepsilon, 1 - \varepsilon)$, and
 $\mu^\varepsilon(\{\langle M \rangle, \langle R \rangle\})(M) = \alpha$ converges to (β, μ) for $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$. For
 $\alpha \geq 1/2$, (β, μ) is sequentially rational.

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies and outcomes

Solution Concepts

Assessments

Sequential rationality

Sequential equilibrium

Examples

Summary

6 Summary



Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Summary



- Extensive games with **imperfect information** can model situations in which the player know only part of the world.
- Modeled by **information sets**, which are histories an agent cannot distinguish.
- **Perfect recall** requires that agents know what they have done and learned.
- Without it, a number of results do not hold.
- Strategies can be **mixed** or **behavioral**, which is equivalent in the case of perfect recall.
- Nash equilibria can be defined this way, however, similar to perfect information games, are not always reasonable.
- **Sequential equilibrium** is a refinement that is based on **assessments**.

Motivation

Definitions

Recall

Strategies
and
outcomes

Solution
Concepts

Summary