
### Multi-Agent Systems

Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg





# Course outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Agent-Based Simulation
- 3 Agent Architectures
- 4 Beliefs, Desires, Intentions
- 5 Norms and Duties
- 6 Communication and Argumentation
- 7 Coordination and Decision Making
  - Distributed Constraint Satisfaction
  - Auctions and Markets
  - Cooperative Game Theory



Agents' abilities and/or preferences differ. How can they reach agreements?



- Argumentation Frameworks approach
  - Centralized approach: Agents exchange their arguments and then compute solution.
- Distributed Constraint Satisfaction approach
  - De-centralized: Agents hold private constraints and exchange partial solutions.




#### CSP (Freuder & Mackworth, 2006)

"Constraint satisfaction involves finding a value for each one of a set of problem variables where constraints specify that some subsets of values cannot be used together." ([1, p. 11])

- Examples:
  - Pick appetizer, main dish, wine, dessert such that everything fits together.
  - Place furniture in a room such that doors, windows, light switches etc. are not blocked.

...



#### CSP

A CSP is a triple  $\mathcal{P} = (X, D, C)$ :

- $X = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ : finite list of variables
- $\square D = (D_1, \dots, D_n): \text{ finite domains}$
- $C = (C_1, ..., C_k)$ : finite list of constraint predicates
- Variable  $x_i$  can take values from  $D_i$
- Constraint predicate  $C(x_i, \ldots, x_l)$  is defined on  $D_i \times \ldots \times D_l$
- Unary constraints:  $C(Wine) \leftrightarrow Wine \neq riesling$
- Binary constraints: C(WineAppetizer, WineMainDish) ↔ WineAppetizer ≠ WineMainDish
- $\blacksquare \text{ k-ary: } C(Alice, Bob, John) \leftrightarrow Alice \land Bob \rightarrow John$

# FREBURG

#### Problem statement

Given a graph G = (V, E) and a set of colors N. Find a coloring  $f : V \to N$  that assigns to each  $v_i \in V$  a color different from those of its neighbors.

#### CSP formulation

Represent graph coloring as CSP  $\mathcal{P} = (X, D, C)$ :

- Each variable  $x_i \in X$  represents the color of node  $v_i \in V$
- Each  $x_i \in X$  can get a value from its domain  $D_i = N$
- For all  $(x_i, x_j) \in E$  add a constraint  $c(x_i, x_j) \leftrightarrow x_i \neq x_j$ .

# Graph coloring: Encoding



Colors: 1, 2, 3

#### **CSP** Encoding

Represention of this instance as a CSP  $\mathcal{P} = (X, D, C)$ :

- $\blacksquare X = (x_A, x_B, x_C, x_D)$
- $\blacksquare D = (\{1,2,3\},\{1,2,3\},\{1,2,3\},\{1,2,3\})$
- $\begin{array}{c} \blacksquare \ C(x_A, x_B) \leftrightarrow x_A \neq x_B, \ C(x_A, x_C) \leftrightarrow x_A \neq x_C, \\ C(x_B, x_C) \leftrightarrow x_B \neq x_C, \ C(x_C, x_D) \leftrightarrow x_C \neq x_D \end{array}$



#### Definition

#### A solution of a CSP $\mathcal{P} = (X, D, C)$ is an assignment

$$a:X
ightarrow igcup_{i:x_i\in X} D_i$$
 such that:

$$\blacksquare$$
  $a(x_i) \in D_i$  for each  $x_i \in X$ 


Every constraint  $C(x_i, ..., x_m) \in C$  is evaluated true under  $\{x_i \rightarrow a(x_i), ..., x_m \rightarrow a(x_m)\}.$ 

#### $\blacksquare \mathcal{P}$ is satisfiable iff $\mathcal{P}$ has a solution.

# Graph coloring: Solution



Colors: 1, 2, 3



#### Solutions

. . .

$$\begin{aligned} &a(x_A) = 1, a(x_B) = 2, a(x_C) = 3, a(x_D) = 1 \\ &a(x_A) = 1, a(x_B) = 2, a(x_C) = 3, a(x_D) = 2 \\ &a(x_A) = 2, a(x_B) = 1, a(x_C) = 3, a(x_D) = 1 \end{aligned}$$

#### Here: 81 assignments, 12 solutions. Can we do better than listing all assignments?

- JNI REIBURG
- Deciding if a graph (V, E) can be colored with k colors is known to be NP-complete.
- CSP is NP-complete:
  - NP-hardness: Polynomial-time reduction on slide 7.
  - Given an assignment, determining whether the assignment is a solution can be done in polynomial time (just check that all the  $|E| \in O(|V|^2)$  constraints).
- Remark: Graph coloring can also be solved by asking if there is a stable labelling for a corresponding argumentation framework (also a NP-complete problem). ⇒CSPs can be solved using argumentation and vice-versa.




- In case of *n* variables with domains of size *d* there are  $O(d^n)$  assignments.
- We can use all sorts of search algorithms to intelligently explore the space of assignments and to eventually find a solution.
- We will use backtracking search and employ two concepts:
  - Partial solution
  - Nogood

# Definition

Given a CSP  $\mathcal{P} = (X, D, C)$ .

- An instantiation of a subset  $X' \subseteq X$  is an assignment  $a: X' \to \bigcup_{i:x_i \in X'} D_i$ .
- An instantiation a of X' is a partial solution if a satisfies all constraints in C defined over some subset of X'. Then a is locally consistent.
- Hence, a solution is a locally consistent instantiation of all  $x \in X$ .





#### Locally consistent partial solutions

$$\begin{array}{l} a(x_A) = \bot, a(x_B) = \bot, a(x_C) = \bot, a(x_D) = \bot \\ a(x_A) = 1, a(x_B) = \bot, a(x_C) = \bot, a(x_D) = \bot \\ a(x_A) = 1, a(x_B) = 2, a(x_C) = \bot, a(x_D) = \bot \\ a(x_A) = 1, a(x_B) = 2, a(x_C) = 3, a(x_D) = \bot \\ a(x_A) = 1, a(x_B) = 2, a(x_C) = 3, a(x_D) = 1 \end{array}$$






#### Definition

Given a CSP  $\mathcal{P} = (X, D, C)$ . An instantiation a' of  $X' \subseteq X$  is a nogood of  $\mathcal{P}$  iff a' cannot be extended to a full solution of  $\mathcal{P}$ .

# Graph coloring: Nogood






#### Nogood

$$a(x_A) = 1, a(x_B) = 1, a(x_C) = \bot, a(x_D) = \bot$$

function BT( $\mathcal{P}$ , part sol) if ISSOLUTION(part sol) then return part sol end if if  $isNoGood(part sol, \mathcal{P})$  then return false end if select some x<sub>i</sub> so far undefined in part\_sol for possible values  $d \in D_i$  for  $x_i$  do  $par\_sol \leftarrow BT(\mathcal{P}, par\_sol[x_i|d])$ if par sol  $\neq$  False then return par sol end if end for return False end function





Nebel, Lindner, Engesser - MAS

18/44



- Nodes A, B, C, and D represent families living in a neighborhood. An edge between two nodes models that the represented families are direct neighbors. Each family wants to buy a new car, but they don't want their respective neighbors to own the same car as they do.
- Centralized solution: A, B, C, D meet, make their constraints public and find a solution together.
- Decentralized solution: A, B, C, D do not meet. Instead, they just buy cars. If someone dislikes one other's choice (s)he will either buy another one or tell the neighbor to do so (without telling why).

# Distributed Constraint Satisfaction (DisCSP): Motivation

- Centralized agent decision making encoded as CSP:
  - Each variable stands for the action of an agent. Constraints between variables model the interrelations between the agents' actions. A CSP solver solves the CSP and communicates the result to each of the agents.
- This, however, presupposes a central component that knows about all the variables and constraints. So what?
  - In some applications, gathering all information to one component is undesirable or impossible, e.g., for security/privacy reasons, because of too high communication costs, because of the need to convert internal knowledge into an exchangeable format.
- ⇒Distributed Constraint Satisfaction (DisCSP)

#### CSP

A DistCSP is a tuple  $\mathcal{P} = (A, X, D, C)$ :

- $A = (ag_1, ..., ag_n)$ : finite list of agents
- **X** =  $(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ : finite list of variables
- $D = (D_1, ..., D_n)$ : finite list of domains
- $\blacksquare$  *C* = (*C*<sub>1</sub>,...,*C*<sub>k</sub>): finite list of constraint predicates
- Variable  $x_i$  can take values from  $D_i$
- Constraint predicate  $C(x_i, ..., x_l)$  is defined on  $D_i \times ... \times D_l$
- Variable x<sub>i</sub> belongs (only) to agent ag<sub>i</sub>
- Agent ag<sub>i</sub> knows all constraints on x<sub>i</sub>




#### Definition

- An assignment a is a solution to a distributed CSP (DisCSP) instance if and only if:
  - Every variable  $x_i$  has some assigned value  $d \in D_i$ , and
  - For all agents  $ag_i$ : Every constraint predicate that is known by  $ag_i$  evaluates to **true** under the assignment  $a(x_i) = d$

# Example as a DisCSP







#### Encoding

$$A = (A, B, C, D), X = (x_A, x_B, x_C, x_D), D_A = \{1, 2, 3\}, D_B = \{1\}, D_C = \{2, 3\}, D_D = \{3\}$$

Constraints

$$A: x_A \neq x_B, x_A \neq x_C$$
  

$$B: x_B \neq x_A, x_B \neq x_C$$
  

$$C: x_C \neq x_A, x_C \neq x_B, x_C \neq x_D$$
  

$$D: x_D \neq x_C$$



- Modification of the backtracking algorithm
  - Agents agree on an instantiation order for their variables (*x*<sub>1</sub> goes first, then goes *x*<sub>2</sub> etc.)
  - Each agent receiving a partial solution instantiates its variable based on the constraints it knows about
  - If the agent finds such a value it will append it to the partial solution and pass it on to the next agent
  - 4 Otherwise, it sends a backtracking message to the previous agent

# Synchronous Backtracking: Example Trace

- 1 A, B, C, and D agree on acting in this order
- 2 A sets  $x_A$  to 1 and sends  $\{x_A \rightarrow 1\}$  to B
- 3 B sends backtrack! to A
- 4 A sets  $x_A$  to 2 and sends  $\{x_A \rightarrow 2\}$  to B
- 5 B sets  $x_B$  to 1 and sends  $\{x_A \rightarrow 2, x_B \rightarrow 1\}$  to C
- 6 C sets  $c_C$  to 3 and sends  $\{x_A \rightarrow 2, x_B \rightarrow 1, x_C \rightarrow 3\}$  to D
- 7 D sends backtrack! to C
- 8 C sends backtrack! to B
- 9 B sends backtrack! to A
- 10 A sets  $x_A$  to 3 and sends  $\{x_A \rightarrow 3\}$  to B
- 11 B sets  $x_B$  to 1 and sends  $\{x_A \rightarrow 3, x_B \rightarrow 1\}$  to C
- 12 C sets  $x_C$  to 2 and sends  $\{x_A \rightarrow 3, x_B \rightarrow 1, x_C \rightarrow 2\}$  to D
- 13 D sets x<sub>D</sub> to 3.





- Pro: No need to share private constraints and domains with some centralized decision maker
- Con: Determining instantiation order requires communication costs
- Con: Agents act sequentially instead of taking advantage of parallelism, i.e., at any given time, only one agent is receiving a partial solution and acts on it



- Each agent maintains three properties:
  - current\_value: value of its owned variable (subject to revision)
  - agent\_view: what the agent knows so far about the values of other agents
  - constraint\_list: ist of private constraints and received nogoods
- Each agent *i* can send messages of two kinds:

(ok?, 
$$x_j \rightarrow d$$
)

• (nogood!, i,  $\{x_j \rightarrow d_j, x_k \rightarrow d_k, \ldots\}$ )



- Assumption: For each contraint, there is one evaluating agent and one value sending agent. Hence, the graph is directed!
  - In some applications this may be naturally so (e.g., only one of the agents actually cares about the constraint)
  - In other applications, two agents involved in a constraint have to decide who will be the sender/evaluator.



```
if received (ok?, (x<sub>j</sub>,d<sub>j</sub>)) then
add (x<sub>j</sub>,d<sub>j</sub>) to agent_view
СнескАдемтView()
end if
```

```
function CHECKAGENTVIEW

if agent_view and current_value are not consistent then

if no value in D_i is consistent with agent_view then

BACKTRACK()

else

select d \in D_i s.th. agent_view and d consistent

current_value \leftarrow d

send (ok?, (x_i, d)) to outgoing links

end if

end if

end function
```

#### function Backtrack

if  $\emptyset$  is a nogood then

broadcast that there is no solution and terminate


#### end if

generate a nogood *V* (inconsistent subset of *agent\_view*) select  $(x_j, d_j) \in V$  s.th.  $x_j$  has lowest priority in V send (nogood!,  $x_i$ , V) to  $x_j$ ; remove  $(x_j, d_j)$  from *agent\_view* end function

#### if received (nogood!, x<sub>i</sub>, {nogood})) then add nogood to constraint\_list if nogood contains agent x<sub>k</sub> that is not yet a neighbor then add x<sub>k</sub> as neighbor and ask x<sub>k</sub> to add x<sub>i</sub> as neighbor end if CHECKAGENTVIEW() end if


# Asynchronous Backtracking: Example





The graph is now directed (source: sender agent, sink: evaluator agent). All other things the same as before.






1 Each agent initializes its private variable and sends ok?-messages down the links

Agent	Current Value	Agent View	Constraint List
Α	1	$\{x_B \rightarrow 1\}$	$x_A \neq x_B$
В	1	Ø	Ø
С	2	$\{x_A \rightarrow 1, x_B \rightarrow 1\}$	$x_C \neq x_A, x_C \neq x_B$
D	3	$\{x_C \rightarrow 2\}$	$x_D \neq x_C$






2 Agent A changes its value to 2 and sends ok? to C

Agent	Current Value	Agent View	Constraint List
Α	2	$\{x_B \rightarrow 1\}$	$x_A \neq x_B$
В	1	Ø	Ø
C	2	$\{x_A \rightarrow 2, x_B \rightarrow 1\}$	$x_C \neq x_A, x_C \neq x_B$
D	3	$\{x_C \rightarrow 2\}$	$x_D \neq x_C$






3 Agent C changes its value to 3 and sends ok? to D

Agent	Current Value	Agent View	Constraint List
Α	2	$\{x_B \rightarrow 1\}$	$x_A \neq x_B$
В	1	Ø	Ø
C	3	$\{x_A \rightarrow 2, x_B \rightarrow 1\}$	$x_C \neq x_A, x_C \neq x_B$
D	3	$\{x_C \rightarrow 3\}$	$x_D \neq x_C$






4 Agent D sends (nogood!, D,  $\{x_c \rightarrow 3\}$ ) to C

Agent	Current Value	Agent View	Constraint List
Α	2	$\{x_B \rightarrow 1\}$	$x_A \neq x_B$
В	1	Ø	Ø
С	3	$\{x_A \rightarrow 2, x_B \rightarrow 1\}$	$x_C \neq x_A, x_C \neq x_B, x_C \neq 3$
D	3	Ø	$x_D \neq x_C$






5 Agent C sends (nogood!, C,  $\{x_A \rightarrow 2\}$ ) to A

Agent	Current Value	Agent View	Constraint List
Α	2	$\{x_B \rightarrow 1\}$	$x_A \neq x_B, x_A \neq 2$
В	1	Ø	Ø
С	3	$\{x_B \rightarrow 1\}$	$x_C \neq x_A, x_C \neq x_B, x_C \neq 3$
D	3	Ø	$x_D \neq x_C$






6 Agent A sets value to 3 and sends ok? to C

Agent	Current Value	Agent View	Constraint List
Α	3	$\{x_B \rightarrow 1\}$	$x_A \neq x_B, x_A \neq 2$
В	1	Ø	Ø
C	3	$\{x_A \rightarrow 3, x_B \rightarrow 1\}$	$x_C \neq x_A, x_C \neq x_B, x_C \neq 3$
D	3	Ø	$x_D \neq x_C$






7 Agent C sets value to 2 and sends ok? to D

Agent	Current Value	Agent View	Constraint List
Α	3	$\{x_B \rightarrow 1\}$	$x_A \neq x_B, x_A \neq 2$
В	1	Ø	Ø
С	2	$\{x_A \rightarrow 3, x_B \rightarrow 1\}$	$x_C \neq x_A, x_C \neq x_B, x_C \neq 3$
D	3	$\{x_C \rightarrow 2\}$	$x_D \neq x_C$


Loops





- A, B, and C set their variables to 1 and send ok?
- 2 A, B, and C set their variables to 2 and send ok?
- 3 A, B, and C set their variables to 1 and send ok?
- 4 ...

Postulate an order over the agents (e.g., IDs). Based on that order, e.g., a link always goes from a higher-order to a lower-order agent.




- A, B, and C set their variables to 1, A and B send ok?
- 2 B and C set their variables to 2, B sends ok?
- 3 C sets its variable to 3

#### Theorem (see [2])

The CSP is unsatisfiable iff the empty Nogood is generated.

Example of an empty nogood:



- A and B set their variables to 1, A sends ok?
- **2** B sends (nogood!,  $x_A \rightarrow 1$ )
- A generates a nogood, and as A's agent view is empty, the generated nogood is empty as well.





#### This time

- Constraint Satisfaction Problem & Backtracking algorithm
- Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem & Synchronous and Asynchronous Backtracking

#### Next time

Agents express preferences by numbers ⇒Optimal assigments using Auctions & Markets

# Course outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Agent-Based Simulation
- 3 Agent Architectures
- 4 Beliefs, Desires, Intentions
- 5 Norms and Duties
- 6 Communication and Argumentation
- 7 Coordination and Decision Making
  - Distributed Constraint Satisfaction
  - Auctions and Markets
  - Cooperative Game Theory



- E. C. Freuder, A. K. Mackworth, Constraint satisfaction: An emerging paradigm, In F. Rossi, P. van Beek, T. Walsh (Eds.) Handbook of Constraint Programming, Elsevier, 2006.
- M. Yokoo, T. Ishida, E. H. Durfee, K. Kuwabara, Distributed constraint satisfaction for formalizing distributed problem solving, In 12th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems '92, pp. 614–621, 1992.
  - M. Yokoo, K. Hirayama, Algorithms for distributed constraint satisfaction: A review, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 198–212, 2000.