



## Second Price Auctions



BURG Second Price Auctions **FREI** Second Price Formally: Auctions A = Nif a = iWi VCG  $\mathbf{v}_i(a) =$ Mechanisms else ■ What about payments? Say player *i* wins:  $\square$   $p^* = 0$  (winner pays nothing): bad idea, players would manipulate and publicly declare values  $w'_i \gg w_i$ . **p^\* = w\_i** (winner pays his valuation): bad idea, players would manipulate and publicly declare values  $w'_i = w_i - \varepsilon$ . **better**:  $p^* = \max_{i \neq i} w_i$  (winner pays second highest bid). BN, RM - Game Theory 7/33 July 17, 2014




Proof See


item. Then  $u_i \ge u'_i$ .


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and  $u'_i$  his utility if he falsely declares  $w'_i$  as his valuation of the

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickrey auction.







BURG

FREI


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
Second Price


Auctions

VCG


Mechanisms







#### Example



■ With player 1: *a* best, since  $v_1(a) + v_2(a) = 10 + 9 = 19 > 17 = 2 + 15 = v_1(b) + v_2(b).$ ■ With player 1, other players (i.e., player 2) lose

- $v_2(b) v_2(a) = 6$  units of utility.
- $\Rightarrow$  Clarke pivot function  $h_1(v_2) = 15$
- $\Rightarrow$  payment function

$$p_1(v_1, \dots, v_n) = \max_{b \in A} \sum_{j \neq 1} v_j(b) - \sum_{j \neq 1} v_j(a) = 15 - 9 = 6.$$
  
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Second Price

Auctions


VCG


Mechanisms

Clarke Pivot Rule


Examples

# **Clarke Pivot Rule**





# BURG **Clarke Pivot Rule FREI** Proof (ctd.) Second Pric Individual rationality: Since $v_i(b) \ge 0$ , Auctions $u_i = v_i(a) + \sum_{i \neq i} v_j(a) - \sum_{i \neq i} v_j(b) \ge \sum_{i=1}^n v_j(a) - \sum_{i=1}^n v_j(b).$ Mechanisms Clarke Pivot Bule Since *a* maximizes $\sum_{i=1}^{n} v_i(a)$ , $\sum_{j=1}^{n} v_j(a) \ge \sum_{j=1}^{n} v_j(b)$ and hence $u_i > 0$ . Therefore, the mechanism is also individually rational. July 17, 2014 21/33 BN, RM - Game Theory



## Example: Bilateral Trade (ctd.)



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Mechanisms

Mechanisms

Examples

Requirement: if *no-trade* is chosen, neither player pays anything:

$$p_s(v_s,v_b)=p_b(v_s,v_b)=0$$

To that end, choose Clarke pivot function for buyer:


$$h_b(v_s) = \max_{a \in A} v_s(a).$$


For seller: Modify Clarke pivot function by an additive constant and set


$$h_s(v_b) = \max_{a \in A} v_b(a) - w_b.$$

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## Example: Public Project (ctd.)

BURG **FREI** Citizen *i* pivotal if  $\sum_i w_i > C$  and  $\sum_{i \neq i} w_i \leq C$ . Payment function for citizen i: Second Pric Auctions  $p_i(v_{1..n}, v_G) = h_i(v_{-i}) - \left(\sum_{i \neq i} v_j(f(v_{1..n}, v_G)) + v_G(f(v_{1..n}, v_G))\right)$ Compatible Mechanisms Mechanism Case 1: Project undertaken, i pivotal: Examples  $p_i(v_{1..n}, v_G) = 0 - \left(\sum_{i \neq i} w_j - C\right) = C - \sum_{i \neq i} w_i$ Case 2: Project undertaken, i not pivotal:  $p_i(v_{1..n}, v_G) = \left(\sum_{i \neq j} w_j - C\right) - \left(\sum_{i \neq j} w_j - C\right) = 0$ Case 3: Project not undertaken:  $p_i(v_{1,n}, v_G) = 0$ 28/33 July 17, 2014 BN, RM - Game Theory

