

## Game theory

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### Exercise Sheet 9

**Due: Monday, July 1, 2013**

#### **Exercise 9.1** (Chance moves, 4 points)

Show that substituting one player's moves by chance moves can be beneficial for him or her in a two-player strategic game.

Formally: Define an extensive game  $\Gamma = \langle N, H, \rho, (u_i)_{i \in N} \rangle$  and an extensive game with chance moves  $\Gamma' = \langle N, H, \rho', f'_c, (u_i)_{i \in N} \rangle$ . The only difference between these two games should be that in  $\Gamma'$  the moves of only one player  $i \in N$  are substituted by chance moves with uniform probability. Furthermore, player  $i$  receives a higher payoff in all subgame perfect equilibria of  $\Gamma'$  as compared to those of  $\Gamma$ .

*Note:* There are examples with only two non-terminal histories.

#### **Exercise 9.2** (Chain store game with two repetitions, 1+1+2 points)

The *Chain store game with two repetitions* has three players: the chain store owner  $L$  and two potential competitors  $K_1$  and  $K_2$ . The game proceeds as follows:

- First,  $K_1$  decides whether he opens a shop ( $Y$ ) or not ( $N$ ).
- If  $K_1$  opens a shop,  $L$  decides, whether to react aggressively ( $A$ ) or passively ( $P$ ).
- After  $K_1$  and, if applicable, also  $L$  have decided, the same decision process repeats with  $K_2$  instead of  $K_1$ .

If  $K_i$  does not open a shop, his payoff is 0. If he opens a shop, his payoff is  $-2$ , if  $L$  reacts aggressively, otherwise it is  $+2$ .

The payoff for player  $L$  is  $+6$ , if none of the other two players opens a shop. For every shop the other players open his payoff is reduced by 2 and for every aggressive action additionally by 1.

- (a) Draw the game tree for the Chain Store Game with two repetitions.
- (b) Determine a subgame perfect equilibrium.
- (c) Determine a Nash equilibrium, which is not a subgame perfect equilibrium and results in a payoff that is different from that of the equilibrium determined in part (b).