Foundations of AI

17. DAI, MAS, and Game Theory

Acting in Groups

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From one Agent to Agent Societies

- AI focuses on one agent
- What happens when we consider more than one agent?
- DAI is the study, construction, and application of multi-agent systems. That is, systems in which several interacting, intelligent agents pursue some set of goals or perform some set of tasks

Characteristics of Multi-Agent Systems

- Agents have typically incomplete information
- Agents are restricted in their capabilities
- System control is distributed
- Data is decentralized
- Computation and communication is asynchronous

Attributes of MAS

	attribute	range
agents	number	from two upward
	uniformity	homogeneous / heterogeneous
	goals	contradictory / complementary
	architecture	reactive / deliberative
	abilities (sensors etc.)	simple / advanced
interaction	frequency	high / low
	persistence	short-term / long-term
	level	signal level / knowledge level
	pattern	decentralized / hierarchical
	variability	fixed / changeable
	purpose	competitive / cooperative
environment	predictability	foreseeable / unforeseeable
	accessibility	limited / unlimited
	dynamics	low / high
	diversity	poor / rich
	availability of resources	restricted / ample

Design Issues

- Main issue:
 - When and how should which agents interact – cooperate and/or compete – to successfully meet their design objectives
- Two design methods
 - bottom-up: look for agent-level capabilities that result in appropriate interaction at the group level
 - top-down: start with group level rules –
 norms and conventions that appropriately constrain the interaction at the agent level

Challenging Issues (1)

- How to enable agents to decompose their goals and tasks, to allocate sub-goals and sub-tasks to other agents?
- How to enable agents to communicate?
- How to enable agents to represent and reason about the actions, plans and knowledge of other agents in order to appropriately interact with them?
- How to enable agents to represent and reason about the state of their interaction process?
- How to enable agents to recognize and reconcile disparate viewpoints and conflicts?

Challenging Issues (2)

- How to engineer and constrain practical multi-agent systems?
- How to effectively balance local computation and communication?
- How to avoid or mitigate harmful (e.g., chaotic) overall system behavior?
- How to enable agents to negotiate and contract?
- How to enable agents to form and dissolve organizational structures?
- How to realize "intelligent processes" such as problem solving, planning, etc. in a multi-agent context?
- How to formally describe multi-agent systems and the interactions among agents?

Examples of MAS

- Electronic commerce and electronic markets, where agents act (buy and sell) on behalf of their users
- Automated meeting scheduling, where agents act on behalf of their users to fix meeting details.
- Industrial manufacturing, where agents represent, e.g., different machines
- Electronic game scenarios, in which animated agents play against each other or against humans
- Groups of physical robots that are supposed to achieve a particular goal


Soccer Playing Robots

- Group of robots that have to coordinate their behaviors (don't interfere!)
- They use a placement strategy based on dynamic role assignment
- Using global sensor fusion, they can compensate for limited sensors




Cleaning Robots

- Goal: group of robots shall clean a large area
- Only limited sensors and communication only over short distances
- Dynamic assignment of areas to clean
- Exchange of information when close to each other




RoboCup Rescue (Simulation)

- Large scale disaster simulation
- Different groups of agents (police, ambulance, fire brigades)
- Uncertain information and uncertain sensors
- Limited communication channels
- Goal: save as many civilians and buildings as possible



Coordination Through Interaction



Task Decomposition and Assignment: Contract Nets (1)

- An agent that wants a task to be solved is the manager
- Agents able to solve the task are potential contractors
- The manager:
 - announces a task
 - receives and evaluates bids from potential contractors
 - awards a contract to a suitable contractor
 - receives and synthesizes the results

Task Decomposition and Assignment: Contract Nets (2)

- The potential contractor:
 - receives task announcements
 - evaluates the capability to respond
 - responds with a bid or declines
 - perform task if the bid is accepted
 - report the results back
- Roles are not specified in advance, but are dynamic
- In particular, a contractor might further decompose a task and give some parts away to other contractors!

Task Decomposition and Assignment: Blackboard Systems

- Data-driven approach to task assignment
- A number of "experts" are sitting next to a blackboard
- When one of the experts sees that she can contribute something, she writes this on the blackboard
- This continues until the "solution" comes up on the blackboard
- Mainly used for distributed problem solving

Cooperation vs. Competition

- Cooperation works fine if we can design the entire system by ourselves.
- We can then try to maximize some performance measure and guarantee that all member of a team of agents work towards the common goal
- If agents work for different parties (e.g., assume a arrival management system for airports with a number of different airlines), the common goal might not be the goal of the single agents!
- If an MAS becomes large and complex, different agents are designed by different parties, and the overall goal is not evident (e.g. in an intelligent house), it might be more robust to design the agents as self-interested agents.

Self-interested Agents

- What is the self-interest of a competitive agent?
- She tries to maximize her expected utility!
- MDP, POMDPS, and reinforcement learning are good for that, but ...
- ... here we have other agents that also act
- All agents know (to a certain extend) what their options are and what the payoff will be
- Strategic deliberation and decision making
 - Choose the option that maximizes own payoff under the assumption that everybody also acts rationally
 - > Does not maximize social welfare but is robust

Game Theory

- Game Theory is the field that analyzes strategic decision situations
 - economic settings
 - military contexts
 - social choices
- Usual assumption: All agents act rationally
 - Unfortunately, humans do not follow this pattern all the time
 - Often change their utility function on the way or simply do not maximize or do not assume that all others act rationally
- Nevertheless: For designing MAS it might just be the right theoretical framework because we can design our agents to act rationally.

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Experiment

- Each of you (the students in this course) have to choose an integer between 1 and 100 in order to guess "2/3 of the average of the responses given by all students in the course."
- Each student who guesses 2/3 of the average of all responses rounded off to the nearest integer, will receive a prize!

Game Theory - Subfields

- Strategic games: One shot games
- Extensive games: Games with more than one move
 - board games, negotiations, repeated strategic games...
- Games with incomplete information
 - Information about the capabilities or intentions of other players are not completely known
- Social Choice Theory
 - Voting, aggregating preferences
- Mechanism design
 - Designing the rules of the game so that an overall goal will be reached
- Coalition games
 - Cooperative game theory: How members of a groups profit from forming coalitions

Conclusions

- DAI and MAS focus on the interaction between agents as opposed to AI, which focuses on single agents
- There are two main strands:
 - Cooperative agents, which work together to achieve a common goal
 - Competitive agents, which try to maximize their own expected utility
 - The latter might also be useful in cooperative settings, because it leads to particularly robust behavior
- Game Theory is the right theoretical framework to deal with strategic decision situations appearing in groups of self-interested agents 17/2