Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning Nonmonotonic Reasoning

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November 21, 23 & 28, 2012





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- If Mary has an essay to write, she will study late in the library.
- She has an essay to write.



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- If Mary has an essay to write, she will study late in the library.
- She has an essay to write.

What do you conclude?



A reasoning task

- If Mary has an essay to write, she will study late in the library.
- She has an essay to write.

In empirical studies 95% of all subjects conclude (modus ponens):

She will study late in the library.



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Literature

- If Mary has an essay to write, she will study late in the library.
- If the library is open, she will study late in the library.
- She has an essay to write.

What do you conclude now?



- If Mary has an essay to write, she will study late in the library.
- If the library is open, she will study late in the library.
- She has an essay to write.

In cognitive studies now only 60% of the subjects conclude:

She will study late in the library.

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- If Mary has an essay to write, she will study late in the library.
- She has an essay to write.
- Conclusion?
  - She will study late in the library.

Reasoning tasks like this (suppression task; Byrne, 1989) suggest that humans often do reason as suggested by classical logics

### A reasoning task



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### All logics presented so far are monotonic.

- A logic is called monotonic if all (logical) conclusions from a knowledge base remain justified when new information is added to the knowledge base.
- Cognitive studies indicate that everyday reasoning is often nonmonotonic (Stenning & Lambalgen, 2008; Johnson-Laird, 2010, etc.).
- When humans reason they use:
  - rules that may have exceptions:
    - If Mary has an essay to write, she normally will study late in the library.
  - default assumptions:
    - The library is open.



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### Defaults in knowledge bases

Often we use default assumptions when definite information is not available or when we want to fix a standard value:

- 1 employee(anne)
- 2 employee(bert)
- 3 employee(carla)
- 4 employee(detlef)
- 5 employee(thomas)
- onUnpaidMPaternityLeave(thomas)
- Z employee(X) ∧¬ onUnpaidMPaternityLeave(X) → gettingSalary(X)
- **Typically:** employee(X)  $\rightarrow \neg$  onUnpaidMPaternityLeave(X)

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### Defaults in common sense reasoning

- **1** Tweety is a bird like other birds.
- 2 During the summer he stays in Northern Europe, in the winter he stays in Africa.
- Would you expect Tweety to be able to fly?
- How does Tweety get from Northern Europe to Africa?

How would you formalize this in formal logic so that you get the expected answers?

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How would you formalize this in formal logic so that you get the expected answers?

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### A formalization ...



- 2 spend-summer(tweety, northern-europe) spend-winter(tweety, africa)
- $\exists \forall x(\mathsf{bird}(x) \to \mathsf{can-fly}(x))$
- 4 far-away(northern-europe, africa)
- **5**  $\forall xyz(\text{can-fly}(x) \land \text{far-away}(y,z) \land \text{spend-summer}(x,y) \land \text{spend-winter}(x,z) → \text{flies}(x,y,z))$
- But: The implication (3) is just a reasonable assumption.
- What if Tweety is an emu?





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### Examples of such reasoning patterns

Closed world assumption: Database of ground atoms. All ground atoms not present are assumed to be false. Negation as failure: In PROLOG, NOT(P) means "P is not

provable" instead of "P is provably false".

Non-strict inheritance: An attribute value is inherited only if there is no more specialized information contradicting the attribute value.

Reasoning about actions: When reasoning about actions, it is usually assumed that a property changes only if it has to change, i.e., properties by default do not change.

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# Default, defeasible, and nonmonotonic reasoning

 Default reasoning: Jump to a conclusion if there is no information that contradicts the conclusion.
 Defeasible reasoning: Reasoning based on assumptions that can turn out to be wrong: conclusions are defeasible. In particular, default reasoning is defeasible.

Nonmonotonic reasoning: In classical logic, the set of consequences grows monotonically with the set of premises. If reasoning is defeasible, then reasoning becomes nonmonotonic.

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### Approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning

- Consistency-based: Extend classical theory by rules that test whether an assumption is consistent with existing beliefs
- ⇒ Nonmonotonic logics such as DL (default logic), NMLP (nonmonotonic logic programming)
  - Entailment-based on normal models: Models are ordered by normality. Entailment is determined by considering the most normal models only.
- $\Rightarrow$  Circumscription, preferential and cumulative logics

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### NM Logic - Consistency-based

# If $\varphi$ typically implies $\psi$ , $\varphi$ is given, and it is consistent to assume $\psi$ , then conclude $\psi$ .

- **1** Typically bird(x) implies can-fly(x)
- 2  $\forall x (\operatorname{emu}(x) \rightarrow \operatorname{bird}(x))$
- $\exists \forall x (\operatorname{emu}(x) \to \neg \operatorname{can-fly}(x))$
- 4 bird(tweety)

### $\Rightarrow$ can-fly(tweety)

5 ... + emu(tweety)

### $\Rightarrow \neg$ can-fly(tweety)

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- $\Rightarrow \neg \text{ can-fly(tweety)}$

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### NM Logic – Normal models

If  $\varphi$  typically implies  $\psi$ , then the models satisfying  $\varphi \land \psi$  should be more normal than those satisfying  $\varphi \land \neg \psi$ .

Similar idea: try to minimize the interpretation of "Abnormality predicates.

- $\forall x(\operatorname{bird}(x) \land \neg \operatorname{Ab}(x) \to \operatorname{can-fly}(x))$
- 2  $\forall x (\operatorname{emu}(x) \rightarrow \operatorname{bird}(x))$
- $\forall x(\operatorname{emu}(x) \to \neg \operatorname{can-fly}(x))$
- 4 bird(tweety)

### Minimize interpretation of Ab: $\Rightarrow$ can-fly(tweety)

### 5 ... + emu(tweety)

### $\Rightarrow$ Now in all models (incl. the normal ones): $\neg$ can-fly(tweety)

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# Default Logic

### Default Logic – Outline

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# Reiter's default logic: motivation

We want to express something like "typically birds fly".

Add non-logical inference rule

 $\frac{\operatorname{bird}(x):\operatorname{can-fly}(x)}{\operatorname{can-fly}(x)}$ 

with the intended meaning: If x is a bird and if it is consistent to assume that x can fly, then conclude that x can fly.

Exceptions can be represented as formulae:

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# Formal framework

■ FOL with classical provability relation  $\vdash$  and deductive closure: Th( $\Phi$ ) := { $\phi | \Phi \vdash \phi$ }

- α: Prerequisite: must have been derived before rule can l applied.
  - $\beta$ : Consistency condition: the negation may not be derivable.
  - $\gamma$ : Consequence: will be concluded.
- A default rule is closed if it does not contain free variables.
- (Closed) default theory: A pair (D, W), where D is a countable set of (closed) default rules and W is a countable set of FOL formulae.

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# Formal framework

■ FOL with classical provability relation  $\vdash$  and deductive closure: Th( $\Phi$ ) := { $\phi | \Phi \vdash \phi$ }

- Default rules:  $\frac{\alpha:\beta}{\gamma}$ 
  - Prerequisite: must have been derived before rule can be applied.
  - $\beta$ : Consistency condition: the negation may not be derivable.
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Default theories extend the theory given by W using the default rules in D ( $\rightsquigarrow$  extensions). There may be zero, one, or many extensions.

### Example

$$W = \{a, \neg b \lor \neg c\}$$
$$D = \left\{\frac{a:b}{b}, \frac{a:c}{c}\right\}$$

One extension contains *b*, the other contains *c*.

### Intuitively, an extension is a set of beliefs resulting from *W* and *D*.

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# Decision problems about extensions in default logic

# Existence of extensions: Does a default theory have an extension?

Credulous reasoning: If  $\varphi$  is in at least one extension,  $\varphi$  is a credulous default conclusion.

Skeptical reasoning: If  $\varphi$  is in all extensions,  $\varphi$  is a skeptical default conclusion.

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# Extensions (informally)

Desirable properties of an extension *E* of  $\langle D, W \rangle$ :

- 1 Contains all facts:  $W \subseteq E$ .
- 2 Is deductively closed: E = Th(E).
- All applicable default rules have been applied:
   If

1 
$$\left(\frac{\alpha:\beta}{\gamma}\right) \in D$$
,  
2  $\alpha \in E$ ,

 $\exists \neg \beta \notin E$ then  $\gamma \in E$ .

Further requirement: Application of default rules must follow in sequence (groundedness).

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$$\left(\frac{\alpha:\beta}{\gamma}\right) \in D$$
,  
2  $\alpha \in F$ 

 $\exists \neg \beta \not\in E$ 

then  $\gamma \in E$ .

## Further requirement: Application of default rules must follow in sequence (groundedness).



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# Groundedness

## Example

$$W = \emptyset$$
$$D = \left\{\frac{a:b}{b}, \frac{b:a}{a}\right\}$$

## *Question*: Should $Th(\{a, b\})$ be an extension?

Answer: No! a can only be derived if we already have derived b. b can only be derived if we already have derived a.

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# Groundedness

## Example

$$W = \emptyset$$
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*Question*: Should  $Th(\{a, b\})$  be an extension?

### Answer: No!

*a* can only be derived if we already have derived *b*. *b* can only be derived if we already have derived *a*.

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# Extensions (formally)

## Definition

Let  $\Delta = \langle D, W \rangle$  be a closed default theory. Let *E* be any set of closed formulae. Define:

$$E_{0} = W$$
$$E_{i} = \operatorname{Th}(E_{i-1}) \cup \left\{ \gamma \middle| \frac{\alpha \colon \beta}{\gamma} \in D, \alpha \in E_{i-1}, \neg \beta \notin E \right\}$$

*E* is called an **extension** of  $\Delta$  if

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# Extensions (formally)

## Definition

Let  $\Delta = \langle D, W \rangle$  be a closed default theory. Let *E* be any set of closed formulae. Define:

$$E_{0} = W$$
$$E_{i} = \mathsf{Th}(E_{i-1}) \cup \left\{ \gamma \middle| \frac{\alpha \colon \beta}{\gamma} \in D, \alpha \in E_{i-1}, \neg \beta \notin E \right\}$$

*E* is called an extension of  $\Delta$  if

$$E = \bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} E_i$$

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# How to use this definition?

- The definition does not tell us how to construct an extension.
- However, it tells us how to check whether a set is an extension:
  - 1 Guess a set E.
  - 2 Then construct sets  $E_i$  by starting with W.
  - If  $E = \bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} E_i$ , then *E* is an extension of  $\langle D, W \rangle$ .

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# Examples

$$D = \left\{ \frac{a:b}{b}, \frac{b:a}{a} \right\} \qquad W = \{a \lor b\}$$

$$D = \left\{ \frac{a:b}{\neg b} \right\} \qquad W = \emptyset$$

$$D = \left\{ \frac{a:b}{\neg b} \right\} \qquad W = \{a\}$$

$$D = \left\{ \frac{a:b}{\neg b}, \frac{c}{c} \right\} \qquad W = \{b \to \neg a \land \neg c\}$$

$$D = \left\{ \frac{c}{\neg d}, \frac{c}{\neg e}, \frac{c}{\neg f} \right\} \qquad W = \emptyset$$

$$D = \left\{ \frac{c}{\neg d}, \frac{c}{\neg c} \right\} \qquad W = \emptyset$$

$$D = \left\{ \frac{c}{\neg d}, \frac{c}{\neg c} \right\} \qquad W = \emptyset$$

$$D = \left\{ \frac{a:b}{c}, \frac{a:d}{e} \right\} \qquad W = \{a, \neg b \lor \neg d\}$$

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# Questions, questions, questions ...

- What can we say about the existence of extensions?
- How are the different extensions related to each other?
  - Can one extension be a subset of another one?
  - Are extensions pairwise incompatible (i.e. jointly inconsistent)?
- Can an extension be inconsistent?

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# Properties of extensions: existence

### Theorem

- **1** If W is inconsistent, there is only one extension.
- A closed default theory (D,W) has an inconsistent extensions E if and only if W is inconsistent.

### Proof idea.

- If *W* is inconsistent, no default rule is applicable and Th(*W*) is the only extension (which is inconsistent as well).
- 2 Claim 1  $\implies$  the if-part.

For **only if**: Let W be consistent and assume that there exists an inconsistent extension E.

Then there exists a consistent  $E_i$  such that  $E_{i+1}$  is inconsistent. That is, there is at least one applied default  $\alpha_i : \beta_i / \gamma_i$  with  $\gamma_i \in E_{i+1} \setminus \text{Th}(E_i), \alpha_i \in E_i$ , and  $\neg \beta_i \notin E$ . But this contradicts the inconsistency of  $E_i$ .

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# Properties of extensions: existence

### Theorem

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# Properties of extensions

### Theorem

If E and F are extensions of  $\langle D, W \rangle$  such that  $E \subseteq F$ , then E = F.

### Proof sketch

 $E = \bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} E_i$  and  $F = \bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} F_i$ . Use induction to show  $F_i \subseteq E_i$ Base case i = 0: Trivially  $E_0 = F_0 = W$ . Inductive case  $i \ge 1$ : Assume  $\gamma \in F_{i+1}$ . Two cases:

# 1 $\gamma \in \text{Th}(F_i)$ implies $\gamma \in \text{Th}(E_i)$ (because $F_i \subseteq E_i$ by IH), and therefore $\gamma \in E_{i+1}$ .

2 Otherwise  $\frac{\alpha:\beta}{\gamma} \in D$ ,  $\alpha \in F_i$ ,  $\neg \beta \notin F$ . However, then we have  $\alpha \in E_i$  (because  $F_i \subseteq E_i$ ) and  $\neg \beta \notin E$  (because of  $E \subseteq F$ ), i.e.,  $\gamma \in E_{i+1}$ .

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# Properties of extensions

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$$E = \bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} E_i \text{ and } F = \bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} F_i. \text{ Use induction to show } F_i \subseteq E_i.$$
  
Base case  $i = 0$ : Trivially  $E_0 = F_0 = W$ .  
Inductive case  $i \ge 1$ : Assume  $\gamma \in F_{i+1}$ . Two cases:

**1**  $\gamma$  ∈ Th( $F_i$ ) implies  $\gamma$  ∈ Th( $E_i$ ) (because  $F_i ⊆ E_i$  by IH), and therefore  $\gamma ∈ E_{i+1}$ .

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# Normal default theories

## All defaults in a normal default theory are normal:

 $\frac{\alpha:\beta}{\beta}$ 

### Theorem

Normal default theories have at least one extension.

### Proof sketch

If W inconsistent, trivial. Otherwise construct

 $E_0 = W$  $E_{i+1} = \operatorname{Th}(E_i) \cup T_i \qquad E = \bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} E_i$ 

where  $T_i$  is a maximal set s.t. (1)  $E_i \cup T_i$  is consistent and (2) if  $\beta \in T_i$ then there is  $\frac{\alpha: \beta}{\beta} \in D$  and  $\alpha \in E_i$ .

# Show: $T_i = \left\{ \beta \mid \frac{\alpha : \beta}{\beta} \in D, \alpha \in E_i, \neg \beta \notin E \right\}$ for all $i \ge 0$ .

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Normal defaults

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### Theorem

Normal default theories have at least one extension.

### Proof sketch.

If W inconsistent, trivial. Otherwise construct

 $\begin{array}{rcl} E_0 &= & W \\ E_{i+1} &= & \operatorname{Th}(E_i) \cup T_i \end{array} \qquad E &= & \bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} E_i \end{array}$ 

where  $T_i$  is a maximal set s.t. (1)  $E_i \cup T_i$  is consistent and (2) if  $\beta \in T_i$ then there is  $\frac{\alpha:\beta}{\beta} \in D$  and  $\alpha \in E_i$ . Show:  $T_i = \left\{\beta \mid \frac{\alpha:\beta}{\beta} \in D, \alpha \in E_i, \neg \beta \notin E\right\}$  for all  $i \ge 0$ .

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## Theorem (Orthogonality)

Let E and F be distinct extensions of a normal default theory. Then  $E \cup F$  is inconsistent.

### Proof.

Let  $E = \bigcup E_i$  and  $F = \bigcup F_i$  with

$$E_{i+1} = \mathsf{Th}(E_i) \cup \left\{ \beta \mid \frac{\alpha \colon \beta}{\beta} \in D, \alpha \in E_i, \neg \beta \notin E \right\}$$

and the same for *F*. Since  $E \neq F$ , there exists a smallest *i* such that  $E_{i+1} \neq F_{i+1}$ . This means there exists  $\frac{\alpha:\beta}{\beta} \in D$  with  $\alpha \in E_i = F_i$ , but with, say,  $\beta \in E_{i+1}$  and  $\beta \notin F_{i+1}$ . This is only possible if  $\neg \beta \in F$ . This means,  $\beta \in E$  and  $\neg \beta \in F$ , i.e.,  $E \cup F$  is inconsistent.

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# Default proofs in normal default theories

## Definition

A default proof of  $\gamma$  in a normal default theory  $\langle D, W \rangle$  is a finite sequence of defaults  $(\delta_i = \frac{\alpha_i : \beta_i}{\beta_i})_{i=1,...,n}$  in *D* such that

$$W \cup \{\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_n\} \vdash \gamma,$$

- 2  $W \cup \{\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_n\}$  is consistent, and

### Theorem

Let  $\Delta = \langle D, W \rangle$  be a normal default theory so that W is consistent. Then  $\gamma$  has a default proof in  $\Delta$  if and only if there exists an extension E of  $\Delta$  such that  $\gamma \in E$ .

Test 2 (consistency) in the proof procedure suggests that default provability is not even semi-decidable.

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# Decidability

### Theorem

It is not semi-decidable to test whether a formula follows (skeptically or credulously) from a default theory.

### Proof.

Let  $\langle D, W \rangle$  be a default theory with  $W = \emptyset$  and  $D = \left\{ \frac{:\beta}{\beta} \right\}$  with  $\beta$  an arbitrary closed FOL formula. Clearly,  $\beta$  is in some/all extensions of  $\langle D, W \rangle$  if and only if  $\beta$  is satisfiable.

The existence of a semi-decision procedure for default proofs implies that there is a semi-decision procedure for satisfiability in FOL. But this is not possible because FOL validity is semi-decidable and this together with semi-decidability of FOL satisfiability would imply decidability of FOL, which is not the case.

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# Complexity of Default Logic

# Propositional default logic

- Propositional DL is decidable.
- How difficult is reasoning in propositional DL?
- The skeptical default reasoning problem (does φ follow from Δ skeptically: Δ |~ φ?) is called PDS, credulous reasoning is called LPDS.
- PDS is coNP-hard: consider  $D = \emptyset$ ,  $W = \emptyset$

LPDS is NP-hard:  
consider 
$$D = \left\{\frac{:\beta}{\beta}\right\}, W = \emptyset.$$



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# Propositional default logic

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## Propositional default logic

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■ LPDS is NP-hard:  
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#### Lemma

 $PDS \in \Pi_2^p$ .

#### Proof sketch

We show that the complementary problem UNPDS (is there an extension *E* such that  $\varphi \notin E$ ) is in  $\Sigma_2^{\rho}$ . The algorithm:

Guess set  $T \subseteq D$  of defaults, those that are applied.

Verify that defaults in  $\mathcal{T}$  lead to  $\mathcal{E}$ , using a SAT oracle and the guessed  $\mathcal{E} := \operatorname{Th}\left(\left\{\gamma: \frac{\alpha:\beta}{\gamma} \in \mathcal{T}\right\} \cup W\right)$ .

Werify that  $\left\{ \gamma\colon rac{lpha:eta}{\gamma}\in T
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ot\models arphi$  (SAT oracle).

 $\rightsquigarrow \mathsf{UNPDS} \in \Sigma_2^p$ .

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2 Verify that defaults in *T* lead to *E*, using a SAT oracle and the guessed  $E := \text{Th}\left(\left\{\gamma: \frac{\alpha:\beta}{\gamma} \in T\right\} \cup W\right)$ .

3 Verify that  $\left\{\gamma: \frac{\alpha:\beta}{\gamma} \in T\right\} \cup W \not\vdash \phi$  (SAT oracle).

#### $\rightsquigarrow$ UNPDS $\in \Sigma_2^p$ .

*Similar:* LPDS 
$$\in \Sigma_2^p$$
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 $\rightsquigarrow \mathsf{UNPDS} \in \Sigma_2^p.$ 

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- 2 Verify that defaults in *T* lead to *E*, using a SAT oracle and the guessed  $E := \text{Th}\left(\left\{\gamma: \frac{\alpha:\beta}{\gamma} \in T\right\} \cup W\right)$ .

**3** Verify that 
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 (SAT oracle).

 $\rightsquigarrow \mathsf{UNPDS} \in \Sigma_2^p$ .

### *Similar:* LPDS $\in \Sigma_2^p$ .

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PDS is  $\Pi_2^p$ -hard.

#### Proof sketch.

Reduction from 2QBF to UNPDS: For  $\exists \vec{a} \forall \vec{b} \varphi(\vec{a}, \vec{b})$  with  $\vec{a} = a_1, \dots, a_n$ and  $\vec{b} = b_1, \dots, b_m$  construct  $\Delta = \langle D, W \rangle$  with

$$D = \left\{ rac{:a_i}{a_i}, rac{:\neg a_i}{\neg a_i}, rac{:\varphi(ec{a},ec{b})}{\varphi(ec{a},ec{b})} 
ight\}, \ W = \emptyset$$

No extension contains both  $a_i$  and  $\neg a_i$ . Then:  $\Delta \mid \not\sim \neg \varphi(\vec{a}, \vec{b}) \quad \text{iff there is an extension } E \text{ s.t. } \neg \varphi(\vec{a}, \vec{b}) \notin E$   $\text{iff there is } E \text{ s.t. } \varphi(\vec{a}, \vec{b}) \in E \text{ (by } \frac{\varphi(\vec{a}, \vec{b})}{\varphi(\vec{a}, \vec{b})} \in D)$  $\text{iff there is } A \subseteq \{a_1, \neg a_1, \ldots, a_n, \neg a_n\} \text{ s.t. } A \models \varphi(\vec{a}, \vec{b}) \text{ is true.}$  FREIBURG

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PDS is  $\Pi_2^p$ -hard.

#### Proof sketch.

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$$D = \left\{ \frac{:a_i}{a_i}, \frac{:\neg a_i}{\neg a_i}, \frac{:\varphi(\vec{a}, \vec{b})}{\varphi(\vec{a}, \vec{b})} \right\}, \ W = \emptyset$$

No extension contains both  $a_i$  and  $\neg a_i$ . Then:

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
PDS is  $\Pi_2^p$ -hard.

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Reduction from 2QBF to UNPDS: For  $\exists \vec{a} \forall \vec{b} \varphi(\vec{a}, \vec{b})$  with  $\vec{a} = a_1, \dots, a_n$ and  $\vec{b} = b_1, \dots, b_m$  construct  $\Delta = \langle D, W \rangle$  with

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## Conclusions & remarks

#### Theorem

PDS is  $\Pi_2^p$ -complete, even for defaults of the form  $\frac{:\alpha}{\alpha}$ .

#### Theorem

LPDS is  $\Sigma_2^p$ -complete, even for defaults of the form  $\frac{\alpha}{\alpha}$ .

- PDS is "easier" than reasoning in most modal logics.
- General and normal defaults have the same complexity.
- Polynomial special cases cannot be achieved by restricting for example, to Horn clauses (satisfiability testing in polynomial time).
- It is necessary to restrict the underlying monotonic reasoning problem and the number of extensions.
- Similar results hold for other nonmonotonic logics.



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## Special Kinds of Defaults

Semi-normal defaults are sometimes useful:

 $\frac{\alpha:\beta\wedge\gamma}{\beta}$ 

Important when one has interacting defaults:

Adult(x): Employed(x)
Employed(x)

Student(x): Adult(x)

Adult(x)Student(x):  $\neg$ Employed(x)

 $\neg$ Employed(x)

For Student(TOM) we get two extensions: one with Employed(TOM) and the other one with ¬Employed(Tom) Since the third rule is "more specific", we may prefer it.

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- Representing conflict-resolution by semi-normal defaults becomes clumsy when the number of default rules becomes high.
- A scheme for assigning priorities would be more elegant (there are indeed such schemes).

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Semi-normal

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- Our examples included open defaults, but the theory covers only closed defaults.
- If we have <sup>α(x̄):β(x̄)</sup>/<sub>γ(x̄)</sub>, then the variables should stand for all nameable objects.
- Problem: What about objects that have been introduced implicitly, e.g., via formulae such a ∃xP(x).
- Solution by Reiter: Skolemization of all formulae in W and D.
- Interpretation: An open default stands for all the closed defaults resulting from substituting ground terms for the variables.

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Skolemization can create problems because it preserves satisfiability, but it is not an equivalence transformation.

#### Example

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 \begin{array}{l} \forall x (\operatorname{Man}(x) \leftrightarrow \neg \operatorname{Woman}(x)) \\ \forall x (\operatorname{Man}(x) \rightarrow (\exists y (\operatorname{Spouse}(x, y) \wedge \operatorname{Woman}(y)) \vee \operatorname{Bachelor}(x)) \\ \operatorname{Man}(\operatorname{TOM}) \\ \operatorname{Spouse}(\operatorname{TOM}, \operatorname{MARY}) \\ \operatorname{Woman}(\operatorname{MARY}) \\ \vdots \\ \frac{: \operatorname{Man}(x)}{\operatorname{Man}(x)} \end{array}
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Skolemization of  $\exists y : \dots$  enables concluding **Bachelor**(TOM)! The reason is that for g(TOM) we get Man(g(TOM)) by default (where g is the Skolem function).

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It is even worse: Logically equivalent theories can have different extensions:

 $W_1 = \{\exists x (P(c,x) \lor Q(c,x))\}$  $W_2 = \{\exists x P(c,x) \lor \exists x Q(c,x)\}$  $D = \left\{\frac{P(x,y) \lor Q(x,y) \colon R}{R}\right\}$ 

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 $W_1$  and  $W_2$  are logically equivalent. However, the Skolemization of  $W_1$ , symbolically  $s(W_1)$ , is not equivalent with  $s(W_2)$ . The only extension of  $\langle D, W_1 \rangle$  is Th $(s(W_1) \cup R)$ . The only extension of  $\langle D, W_2 \rangle$  is Th $(s(W_2))$ .

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Although Reiter's definition of DL makes sense, one can come up with a number of variations and extend the investigation ...

- Extensions can be defined differently (e.g., by remembering consistency conditions).
- ... or by removing the groundedness condition.
- Open defaults can be handled differently (more model-theoretically).
- General proof methods for the finite, decidable case
- Applications of default logic:
  - Diagnosis
  - Reasoning about actions

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