A Motivating Example: Defaults in Knowledge Bases

1. employee(anne)
2. employee(bert)
3. employee(carla)
4. employee(detlef)
5. employee(thomas)
6. onUnpaidMPaternityLeave(thomas)
7. employee(X) \land \neg onUnpaidMPaternityLeave(X) \rightarrow gettingSalary(X)
8. typically: employee(X) \rightarrow \neg onUnpaidMPaternityLeave(X)

A Motivating Example: Common Sense Reasoning

1. Tweety is a bird like other birds.
2. During the summer he stays in Northern Europe, in the winter he stays in Africa.
   ▶ Would you expect Tweety to be able to fly?
   ▶ How does Tweety get from Northern Europe to Africa?

How would you formalize this in formal logic so that you get the expected answers?
A Formalization . . .

1. bird(tweety)
2. spend-summer(tweety,northern-europe) ∧ spend-winter(tweety,africa)
3. ∀x(bird(x) → can-fly(x))
4. far-away(northern-europe,africa)
5. ∀xyz(can-fly(x) ∧ far-away(y, z) ∧ spend-summer(x, y) ∧ spend-winter(x, z) → flies(x, y, z))

▶ The implication (3) is just a reasonable assumption
▶ What if Tweety is an emu?

Examples of Such Reasoning Patterns

Closed world assumption: Data-base of ground atoms. All ground atoms not present are assumed to be false.

Negation as failure: In PROLOG, NOT(P) means “P is not provable” instead of “P is provably false”.

Non-strict inheritance: An attribute value is inherited only if there is no more specialized information contradicting the attribute value.

Reasoning about actions: When reasoning about actions, it is usually assumed that a property changes only if it has to change, i.e., properties by default do not change.

Default, Defeasible, and Nonmonotonic Reasoning

Default Reasoning: Jump to a conclusion if there is no information that contradicts the conclusion.

Defeasible Reasoning: Reasoning based on assumptions that can turn out to be wrong, — i.e., conclusions are defeasible. In particular, default reasoning is defeasible.

Nonmonotonic Reasoning: In classical logic, the set of consequences grows monotonically with the set of premises. If reasoning is defeasible, then reasoning becomes nonmonotonic.

Approaches to Nonmonotonic Reasoning

▶ Consistency-based: Extend classical theory by rules that test whether an assumption is consistent with existing beliefs
⇒ nonmonotonic logics like DL (default logic), NMLP (nonmonotonic logic programming)
▶ Entailment-based on normal models: Models are ordered by normality. Entailment is determined by considering the most normal models only.
⇒ Circumscription, Preferential and Cumulative Logics
NM Logic – Consistency-Based

If $\varphi$ typically implies $\psi$, $\varphi$ is given, and it is consistent to assume $\psi$, then conclude $\psi$.

1. Typically bird($x$) implies can-fly($x$)
2. $\forall x (\text{emu}(x) \rightarrow \text{bird}(x))$
3. $\forall x (\text{emu}(x) \rightarrow \neg\text{can-fly}(x))$
4. bird(tweety)
   $\Rightarrow$ can-fly(tweety)
5. $\ldots + \text{emu(tweety)}$
   $\Rightarrow \neg\text{can-fly(tweety)}$

NM Logic – Normal Models

If $\varphi$ typically implies $\psi$, then the models satisfying $\varphi \land \psi$ should be more normal than those satisfying $\varphi \land \neg\psi$.

Similarly, try to minimize the interpretation of "Abnormality" predicates.

1. $\forall x (\text{bird}(x) \land \neg\text{Ab}(x) \rightarrow \text{can-fly}(x))$
2. $\forall x (\text{emu}(x) \rightarrow \text{bird}(x))$
3. $\forall x (\text{emu}(x) \rightarrow \neg\text{can-fly}(x))$
4. bird(tweety)
   $\Rightarrow$ can-fly(tweety)
5. $\ldots + \text{emu(tweety)}$
   $\Rightarrow$ Now in all models (incl. the normal ones): $\neg\text{can-fly(tweety)}$

Default Logic – Outline

Introduction

Default Logic

Basics
Extensions
Properties of Extensions
Normal Defaults
Default Proofs
Decidability
Propositional DL

Complexity of Default Logic

Literature

Motivation: Reiter’s Default Logic

- We want to express something like “typically birds fly”.
- Add non-logical inference rule

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{bird}(x) : \text{can-fly}(x) & \\
\text{can-fly}(x)
\end{align*}
\]

with the intended meaning:
If $x$ is a bird and if it is consistent to assume that $x$ can fly, then conclude that $x$ can fly.

- Exceptions can be represented as formulae:

\[
\begin{align*}
\forall x (\text{penguin}(x) \rightarrow \neg\text{can-fly}(x)) \\
\forall x (\text{emu}(x) \rightarrow \neg\text{can-fly}(x)) \\
\forall x (\text{kiwi}(x) \rightarrow \neg\text{can-fly}(x))
\end{align*}
\]
Formal Framework

- **FOL with classical provability relation ⊢ and deductive closure:**
  \[ \text{Th}(\Phi) := \{ \phi | \Phi \vdash \phi \} \]

- **Default rules:**
  \[ \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \frac{\gamma}{} \]

  - \(\alpha\): Prerequisite: must have been derived before rule can be applied.
  - \(\beta\): Consistency condition: the negation may not be derivable.
  - \(\gamma\): Consequence: will be concluded.

- A default rule is closed if it does not contain free variables.

- **(Closed) default theory:** A pair \((D, W)\), where \(D\) is a countable set of (closed) default rules and \(W\) is a countable set of FOL formulae.

Extensions of Default Theories

Default theories extend the theory given by \(W\) using the default rules \(D\) (extensions). There may be zero, one, or many extensions.

**Example**

\[
W = \{ a, \neg b \lor \neg c \} \\
D = \{ a : b, a : c \} \\
\]

One extension contains \(b\), the other contains \(c\).

Intuitively: an extension is a set of beliefs resulting from \(W\) and \(D\).

Decision Problems about Extensions in Default Logic

**Existence of extensions:** Does a default theory have an extension?

**Credulous reasoning:** If \(\varphi\) is in at least one extension, \(\varphi\) is a credulous default conclusion.

**Skeptical reasoning:** If \(\varphi\) is in all extensions, \(\varphi\) is a skeptical default conclusion.

Extensions – Informally

Desirable properties of an extension \(E\) of \((D, W)\):

1. Contains all facts \(W \subseteq E\).
2. Is deductively closed: \(E = \text{Th}(E)\).
3. All applicable default rules have been applied:
   - If \((\alpha : \beta) \in D\), \(\alpha \in E\), \(\neg \beta \notin E\)
   - then \(\gamma \in E\).

\[ \Rightarrow \text{Requirement: Application of default rules must follow in sequence (groundedness).} \]
Default Logic Extensions

Groundedness

Example

\[ W = \emptyset \]
\[ D = \left\{ \frac{a : b}{b} : \frac{b : a}{a} \right\} \]

Question: Should \( \text{Th}\{a, b\}\) be an extension?

Answer: No!

\( a \) can only be derived if we already have derived \( b \).
\( b \) can only be derived if we already have derived \( a \).

Extensions – Formally

Definition

Let \( \Delta = (D, W) \) be a closed default theory and let \( E \) be a set of closed formulae.

Let

\[ E_0 = W \]
\[ E_i = \text{Th}(E_{i-1}) \cup \left\{ \frac{\gamma}{\alpha : \beta} \in D, \alpha \in E_{i-1}, \neg \beta \notin E \right\} \]

Then \( E \) is an extension of \( \Delta \) iff

\[ E = \bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} E_i. \]

Examples

\[
\begin{align*}
D &= \left\{ \frac{a : b}{b}, \frac{b : a}{a} \right\} & W &= \{a \lor b\} \\
D &= \left\{ \frac{a : b}{\neg b} \right\} & W &= \emptyset \\
D &= \left\{ \frac{a : b}{\neg b} \right\} & W &= \{a\} \\
D &= \left\{ \frac{a : b : c}{a}, \frac{b}{c} \right\} & W &= \{b \rightarrow \neg a \land \neg c\} \\
D &= \left\{ \frac{c : d : e}{\neg d, \neg e, \neg f} \right\} & W &= \emptyset \\
D &= \left\{ \frac{c : d}{\neg d, \neg c} \right\} & W &= \emptyset \\
D &= \left\{ \frac{a : b}{c}, \frac{a : d}{e} \right\} & W &= \{a, \neg b \lor \neg d\}
\end{align*}
\]
Default Logic Properties of Extensions

Questions, Questions, Questions . . .

- What can we say about the existence of extensions?
- How are the different extensions related to each other?
  - Can one extension be a subset of another one?
  - Are extensions pairwise incompatible (i.e. jointly inconsistent)?
- Can an extension be inconsistent?

Properties of Extensions

Theorem

1. If \( W \) is inconsistent, there is only one extension.
2. A closed default theory \((D, W)\) has an inconsistent extension iff \( W \) is inconsistent.

Proof idea.

1. If \( W \) is inconsistent, no default rule is applicable and \( \text{Th}(W) \) is the only extension.
2. Claim 1 \( \implies \) the if-part.

For only if: If \( W \) is consistent, there is a consistent \( E \) s.t. \( E_{i+1} \) is inconsistent.

Let \( \{\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n\} = E_{i+1} \setminus \text{Th}(E_i) \) (the conclusions of applied defaults). Now \( \{\neg \beta_1, \ldots, \neg \beta_n\} \cap E = \emptyset \) because otherwise the defaults are not applicable.

But this contradicts the inconsistency of \( E \).

Properties of Extensions

Theorem

1. If \( W \) is inconsistent, no default rule is applicable and \( \text{Th}(W) \) is the only extension.
2. A closed default theory \((D, W)\) has an inconsistent extension iff \( W \) is inconsistent.

Proof idea.

1. If \( W \) is inconsistent, no default rule is applicable and \( \text{Th}(W) \) is the only extension.
2. Claim 1 \( \implies \) the if-part.

For only if: If \( W \) is consistent, there is a consistent \( E \) s.t. \( E_{i+1} \) is inconsistent.

Let \( \{\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n\} = E_{i+1} \setminus \text{Th}(E_i) \) (the conclusions of applied defaults). Now \( \{\neg \beta_1, \ldots, \neg \beta_n\} \cap E = \emptyset \) because otherwise the defaults are not applicable.

But this contradicts the inconsistency of \( E \).

Normal Default Theories

All defaults in a normal default theory are normal:

\[
\frac{\alpha}{\beta}.
\]

Theorem

Normal default theories have at least one extension.

Proof sketch.

If \( W \) inconsistent, trivial. Otherwise construct

\[
\begin{align*}
E_0 &= W \\
E_{i+1} &= \text{Th}(E_i) \cup T_i \\
E &= \bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} E_i
\end{align*}
\]

where \( T_i \) is a maximal set s.t. (1) \( E_i \cup T_i \) is consistent and (2) if \( \beta \in T_i \) then there is \( \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \in D \) and \( \alpha \in E_i \).

Show: \( T_i = \left\{ \beta \left| \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \in D, \alpha \in E_i, \neg \beta \notin E \right. \right\} \) for all \( i \geq 0 \).
Normal Default Theories: Extensions are Orthogonal

Theorem (Orthogonality)
Let $E$ and $F$ be distinct extensions of a normal default theory. Then $E \cup F$ is inconsistent.

Proof.
Let $E = \bigcup E_i$ and $F = \bigcup F_i$ with
$$E_{i+1} = \text{Th}(E_i) \cup \left\{ \alpha : \beta \in D, \alpha \in E_i, \lnot \beta \notin E \right\}$$
and the same for $F$. Since $E \neq F$, there exists a smallest $i$ such that $E_{i+1} \neq F_{i+1}$. This means there exists $\alpha : \beta \in D$ with $\alpha \in E_i = F_i$ but $\beta \in E_{i+1}$ and $\beta \notin F_{i+1}$. This is only possible if $\lnot \beta \in F$. This means $\beta \in E$ and $\lnot \beta \notin F$, i.e., $E \cup F$ is inconsistent.

Decidability

Theorem
It is not semi-decidable to test whether a formula follows (skeptically or credulously) from a default theory.

Proof.
Let $(D, W)$ be a default theory with $W = \emptyset$ and $D = \left\{ \frac{\alpha : \beta}{\beta} \right\}$ with $\beta$ an arbitrary closed FOL formula. Clearly, $\beta$ is in some/all extensions of $(D, W)$ if and only if $\beta$ is satisfiable. The existence of a semi-decision procedure for default proofs implies that there is a semi-decision procedure for satisfiability in FOL. But this is not possible because FOL validity is semi-decidable and this together with semi-decidability of FOL satisfiability would imply decidability of FOL, which is not the case.

Propositional Default Logic

Propositional DL is decidable.

How difficult is reasoning in propositional DL?

The skeptical default reasoning problem (does $\varphi$ follow from $\Delta$ skeptically: $\Delta \vdash \varphi$?) is called PDS, credulous reasoning is called LPDS.

(L)PDS is co-NP-hard (let $D = \emptyset$, $W = \emptyset$) and NP-hard (let $W = \emptyset$, $D = \left\{ \frac{\alpha : \beta}{\beta} \right\}$).
### Complexity of DL – Outline

**Introduction**

**Default Logic**

Complexity of Default Logic
- Complexity of DL
- Semi-Normal Defaults
- Open Defaults
- Outlook

**Literature**

---

### Skeptical Reasoning in Propositional DL

**Lemma**

\[ PDS \in \Pi_2^p. \]

**Proof.**

We show that the complementary problem \( \text{UNPDS} \) (is there an extension \( E \) such that \( \varphi \notin E \)) is in \( \Sigma_2^p \).

The **algorithm:** Guess set \( T \subseteq D \) of defaults: those that are applied.

Verify that defaults in \( T \) lead to \( E \), using a SAT oracle and the guessed \( E = \text{Th}(\{\gamma | \alpha : \beta, \gamma \in T\} \cup W) \).

Verify that \( \{\gamma | \alpha : \beta, \gamma \in T\} \cup W \nvdash \varphi \) (SAT oracle).

\( \Rightarrow \) \( \text{UNPDS} \in \Sigma_2^p \).

Note: \( \text{LPDS} \in \Sigma_2^p \).

---

### \( \Pi_2^p \)-Hardness

**Lemma**

\( PDS \) is \( \Pi_2^p \)-hard.

**Proof.**

Reduction from 2QBF to UNPDS: For \( \exists \vec{a} \forall \vec{b} \phi(\vec{a}, \vec{b}) \) with \( \vec{a} = a_1, \ldots, a_n \) and \( \vec{b} = b_1, \ldots, b_m \) construct \( \Delta = (D, W) \) with

\[
D = \{ a_i, \neg a_i, \neg \phi(a, b) \}, \quad W = \emptyset
\]

No extension contains both \( a_i \) and \( \neg a_i \).

Now \( \Delta \vdash \neg \phi(\vec{a}, \vec{b}) \) iff there is extension \( E \) s.t. \( \neg \phi(\vec{a}, \vec{b}) \notin E \)

- if there is \( E \) s.t. \( \phi(\vec{a}, \vec{b}) \in E \) (by \( \neg \phi(\vec{a}, \vec{b}) \in D \))
- if there is \( A \subseteq \{a_1, \neg a_1, \ldots, a_n, \neg a_n\} \) s.t. \( A \models \phi(\vec{a}, \vec{b}) \)
- \( \exists \vec{a} \forall \vec{b} \phi(\vec{a}, \vec{b}) \) is true.

---

### Conclusions & Remarks

**Theorem**

\( PDS \) is \( \Pi_2^p \)-complete, even for defaults of the form \( \frac{\alpha}{\alpha} \).

**Theorem**

\( \text{LPDS} \) is \( \Sigma_2^p \)-complete, even for defaults of the form \( \frac{\alpha}{\alpha} \).

- \( PDS \) is “easier” than reasoning in most modal logics.
- General and normal defaults have the same complexity.
- Polynomial special cases cannot be achieved by restricting, for example, to Horn clauses (satisfiability testing in polynomial time).
- It is necessary to restrict the underlying monotonic reasoning problem and the number of extensions.
- Similar results hold for other nonmonotonic logics.
Semi-Normal Defaults (1)

Semi-normal defaults are sometimes useful:

\[ \alpha : \beta \land \gamma \frac{\beta}{\gamma} \]

Important when one has interacting defaults:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Adult}(x) : \ & \text{Employed}(x) \\
\text{Employed}(x) \\
\text{Student}(x) : \ & \text{Adult}(x) \\
\text{Adult}(x) \\
\text{Student}(x) : \ & \neg \text{Employed}(x) \\
\neg \text{Employed}(x)
\end{align*}
\]

For \text{Student}(TOM) we get two extensions: one with \text{Employed}(Tom) and the other one with \neg \text{Employed}(Tom).

Since the third rule is “more specific”, we may prefer it.

Open Defaults (1)

- Our examples included open defaults, but the theory covers only closed defaults.
- If we have \[ \forall x (\alpha(x) : \beta(x)) \] \[ \frac{\forall x (\alpha(x))}{\beta(x)} \]
- Then the variables should stand for all nameable objects.
- **Problem**: What about objects that have been introduced implicitly: \[ \exists x P(x) \]
- **Solution by Reiter**: Skolemization of all formulae in \( W \) and \( D \).
- **Interpretation**: An open default stands for all the closed defaults resulting from substituting ground terms for the variables.

Semi-Normal Defaults (2)

- Since being a student is an exception, we could use a semi-normal default to exclude students from employed adults:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Student}(x) : \ & \neg \text{Employed}(x) \\
\neg \text{Employed}(x)
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Adult}(x) : \ & \text{Employed}(x) \land \neg \text{Student}(x) \\
\text{Employed}(x) \\
\text{Student}(x) : \ & \text{Adult}(x) \\
\text{Student}(x) \land \neg \text{Employed}(x)
\end{align*}
\]

- **Representing conflict-resolution by semi-normal defaults becomes clumsy when the number of default rules becomes high**.
- A scheme for assigning priorities would be more elegant (there are indeed such schemes).

Open Defaults (2)

Skolemization can create problems because it preserves satisfiability, but it is not an equivalence transformation.

**Example**

\[
\forall x (\text{Man}(x) \leftrightarrow \neg \text{Woman}(x)) \\
\forall x (\text{Man}(x) \rightarrow (\exists y (\text{Spouse}(x,y) \land \text{Woman}(y)) \lor \text{Bachelor}(x))) \\
\text{Man}(TOM) \\
\text{Spouse}(TOM, MARY) \\
\text{Woman}(MARY) \\
\text{Man}(MARY)
\]

Skolemization of \[ \exists y : \ldots \]

enables concluding \text{Bachelor}(TOM)!

The reason is that for \( g(TOM) \) we get \text{Man}(g(TOM)) by default (\( g \) is the Skolem function).
Open Defaults (3)

It is even worse: Logically equivalent theories can have different extensions:

\[ W_1 = \{ \exists x (P(C, x) \lor Q(C, x)) \} \]
\[ W_2 = \{ \exists x P(C, x) \lor \exists x Q(C, x) \} \]
\[ D = \{ \frac{P(x, y) \lor Q(x, y)}{R} \} \]

\( W_1 \) and \( W_2 \) are logically equivalent. However, the Skolemization of \( W_1 \), symbolically \( s(W_1) \), is not equivalent with \( s(W_2) \). The only extension of \((D, W_1)\) is \( \text{Th}(s(W_1) \cup R) \). The only extension of \((D, W_2)\) is \( \text{Th}(s(W_2)) \).

Note: Skolemization is not the right method to deal with open defaults in the general case.

Outlook

Although Reiter’s definition of DL makes sense, one can come up with a number of variations and extend the investigation . . .

▶ Extensions can be defined differently (e.g., by remembering consistency conditions).
▶ . . . or by removing the groundedness condition.
▶ Open defaults can be handled differently (more model-theoretically).
▶ General proof methods for the finite, decidable case
▶ Applications of default logic:
  ▶ Diagnosis
  ▶ Reasoning about actions

Literature

Raymond Reiter.
A logic for default reasoning.

Georg Gottlob.
Complexity Results for Nonmonotonic Logics.

Marco Cadoli and Marco Schaerf.
A Survey of Complexity Results for Non-monotonic Logics.

Gerhard Brewka.
Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Logical Foundations of Commonsense.

Franz Baader and Bernhard Hollunder.
Embedding defaults into terminological knowledge representation formalisms.